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ABSTRACT 
Whereas much research has been devoted to the evaluation of 
regulatory po licies, only in the past decade has attention turned to 
developing a theory of the regulatory process: why regulation comes 
about , and what factors determine its performance . As yet, the theory 
is still rudimentary, and large areas of positive political theory and 
organization theory have not been applied to the problem of 
understanding regulation. This paper summarizes the theory of 
regulation as it now stands and examines how additional ideas from 
more general theories in social science might be applied to regulation. 
GOVERNMENT REGULATORY BEHAVIOR : 
A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY AND SYNTHESIS* 
Roger G. Noll 
Government regulation is a pervas ive f eature of the American 
economic system. It is a uniquely American approach to the 
introduction of political control s  to market processes. Thi� purpose of 
this chapter is to review the range of theories to explain the 
development and direction of regulatory policy and to point out 
fruitful but insufficiently developed lines for further resE�arch. 
Before proceeding, a definition of regulation is in order. All 
levels of government attempt to control some private sector economic 
decisions to which the government is not a party. One such method of 
control is to assign to a government agency the responsibility to write 
rules constraining certain kinds of private economic decisions, using a 
quasi-judicial administrative process to develop these rules. The 
bureaus organized to undertake such tasks are herein ref erred to as 
regulatory agencies, a definition that is developed and def1�nded in 
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Foundation, grant DA 3 9495. Research assistance was supplied by John 
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Noll ( 1980) . Included in the classification are agencies that control 
aspects of transactions such as the price or the quality of the good 
transacted, that mandate certain features of the production process 
such as emissions control methods and worker safety requirements ,  or 
that control entry such as by licensing. Excluded are agencies that 
are public enterprises in that their primary function is either to 
procure private goods or to produce government goods, that try to 
prevent certain types of behavior or transactions rather than manage 
them, that manage government financial affairs, such as col lecting 
taxes or control ling the money supp ly , or that try to alter market 
behavior by subsidy or by placing conditions on government procurement 
when the government is an important but not the sole entity on the 
demand side of the market. 
The reason for the focus on regulation is more practical than 
theoretical. It may well be the case that the theory of regulation is 
very close to the general theory of government policy. BUt regulation 
is a di stinct kind of policy that has spawned a di stinct theoretical 
and empirical literature , especially in economics and law in which its 
study has been elevated to the status of a subdiscipline. Moreover, 
because the state ot knowledge about the development of the character 
of public policies is still rather primitive, it probably makes sense 
to focus work at this stage on special theories of specific kinds of 
policies. 
Regulatory agencies make many decisions that, in principle at 
least, affect economic efficiency. The economics literature as well as 
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regulatory law emphasizes the effects of regulation on static 
efficiency -- that is,  the effect of regulatory decisions on cost s ,  
prices and product quality, given unchanging technology and consumer 
tastes .  By controlling prices, profits, entry and the attributes of 
products or processes, regulators directly alter the net economic 
benefits derived f rom the regulated industry.  To the extent that 
regulatory rules counteract market imperfections, they contribute to 
economic efficiency; to the extent that they reduce production 
efficiency or confer monopoly market positions on regulated f inns, they 
reduce efficiency . 
In addition, the policies of regulatory agencies als.o effect 
dynamic efficiency -- that is,  the economic optimality of the rate and 
pattern of technological change. In some cases, agencies ha.ve an 
explicit mandate to influence technology, either by subsidizing 
research and development, as was the case of the Atomic Energy 
Commission p;rior to 1974, or by imposing technical requirements 
intended to improve the performance of a particular industry, such as 
the promotion of UHF television by the FCC (Webbink, 1969) . More 
commonly , agencies play a more passive role, approving or disapproving 
the adoption of new technology on the basis of other policy mandates 
(Ackerman and Hassler, 1 981;  Capron, 1 97 1 ;  Peltzman, 1974; and Warford, 
197 1 ) .  Finally, agencies make decisions on matters not directly 
related to the choice of technology, but that, perhaps unexpectedly to 
the agency, indirectly influence technological change .  Thus, 
regulatory lag - the time required for regulators to change· regulations 
in response to changed conditions -- may change the incentive of 
regulated firms to innovate, and rate-of-return regulation may bias 
innovation of regulated firms in favor of more capital-intensive 
tethnologies (Westfield, 1971 ) .  
4 
The research literature on the effects of regulatory agencies 
on economic efficiency reaches generally harsh judgment s .  Government 
agencies are pictured as ineffective in dealing with market failure 
problems such as environmental externalities or monopolistic control of 
markets,  while generating serious liabilities by protecting business 
against competition, thwarting warranted technological and economic 
changes ,  and imposing significant costs on consumers without much in 
the way of benefits (Joskow and Noll,  1981) . 
This chapter does not evaluate the empirical literature on the 
undesirable economic effects of regulatory agencies.  Instead, it  
presumes that agencies do have such effect s .  The purpose here is  to 
examine the literature on government processes and bureaucratic 
organizations in search of plausible explanations of the selection of 
regulatory policie s .  In principle, theories of government policymaking 
behavior could provide some basis for evaluating propo sals to 
reorganize a regulat ory agency, to redesign its mandate or to replace 
regulation with some other form of government policy, and for 
predicting the likely long-term effect of a regulat ory agency. 
As an il lustration} during the first term of the Nixon 
Administration, the President's Advisory Commission on Executive 
Organization ( 1971 ) -- the Ash Council -- propo sed a sweeping 
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reorganization of the executive structure of the federal government . 
The Council" s report on regulatory agencies contained numerous 
proposals motivated in part by the perception that independent 
regulatory authorities create economic inefficiency. The prciposals 
included transferring the agencies to the executive branch, replacing 
commissions with single administrative beads , streamlining the 
decisionmaking process and combining regulatory agencies with related 
responsibilities into single agencies. A relevant question is whether 
existing knowledge on the operation of government bureaucracies 
provides support for the notion that these organizational changes would 
significantly improve the policies of regulatory institutionn and the 
performance ot regulated firms. 
Dissatisfaction with the performance of a regulated industry 
can lead to refonn proposals of four types. 
1. .Reorganizatio11. The theory underlying reorgani:�ation
proposals is that the location of regulatory responsibility within the 
governmental hierarchy and the organizational structure of the agency 
significantly affect policy outcomes.  Within this class of reforms are 
moving an independent commission into an executive department,  
combining several bureaus with related responsibilities into a new 
agency , changing the internal structure of a bureau such as by 
replacing a commission with a single admini strator, or reshuffling 
policy responsibilities among agencies, such as the transfer of the 
maritime subsidy program from the independent Federal Maritime 
Commission to the Department of Transportation. 
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2 .  Procedural Reform. Administrative law, legal precedent 
and the operating rules adopted by agencies determine the flow of 
information into administrative proceedings and, in principle, 
constrain the decisionmaking power of agencies. A common complaint is 
that these procedures cause agencies to be too slow in making decisions 
and too inflexible,  particularly in adjusting policies to changing 
external circumstances. Another complaint is that agencies 
systematically pay too little attention to some types of information. 
Reform proposals include changing the rules of evidence, relaxing the 
requirement that decisions take account of all evidence submitted but 
of no other factual material, imposing deadlines on agency decisions 
and requiring benefit/cost analysis.  
3.  Changing the Mandate. Another locus of criticisms of the 
regulatory process focuses on the objectives ,  methods and powers given 
to agencies by Congress through legislation and, to a lesser degree, by 
the President through executive order. If agencies adopt bad policies 
or overlook key issues, one possible solution lies in clarifying or 
correcting the mandate (Friendly, 1962) . Another is to use a method 
other than regulation to achieve the same objectives, such as the use 
of taxes (Mills and White, 1978) or tradable permits (Hahn and Noll , 
1 982) to control pollution. 
4 .  Altering the External Environment . If the interactions 
among an agency, a particular industry, other groups with a stake in 
the industry's performance, the courts and the Congress produce 
unsatisfactory results, one approach to ref orm is to restructure these 
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external institutions so that the agency is more able to produce the 
desired perf onnance. For example,  the single entity proposal for 
international telecommunications (Peck, 1 970) -- that the international 
carriers be merged -- was based upon the presumption that the Federal 
Communications Commission could regulate the introduction of satellite 
technology more effectively if the industry were monopolized. At the 
other extreme, the antitrust case that successfully sought the 
dissolution of the American Telegraph and Telephone Company was based 
in part on the belief that the wealth and political power of AT&T made 
it essentially unregulatable. Public ownership is sti l l  another 
alternative arrangement of the managed industry. Other reforms of this 
type include proposals to create a special type of court to review 
regulatory decisions, to create a special agency to participate in 
regulatory decisions as r1�presentatives of consumer interests and to 
reorganize the Congressional oversight process. 
All four types of propo sals rest upon theoretical conceptions 
of the behavior of government agencies, private organizations and 
elected political officials. Yet the proponents of reform :rarely 
justify their proposals by reference to explicit theoretical and 
empirical observations on the interactions among these group s .  Nor is 
much thought normally given to the organizational problems of 
structuring an effective agency when legislation is adopted that 
establishes a new regulatory role for the government. 
A useful theory of regulatory policy would provide empirically 
verifiable propositions on the relationships among structur1�, 
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responsibility, powers and performance of regulatory agency, and 
subsidiary propositions about how private organizations influence the 
design of policy and cope with the particular government regime that is 
established. It would predict the capacity of an agency to control 
different aspects of private market behavior, and would identify 
optimal choices of agency organization, procedures and policy 
instruments for a given policy objective and a g iven structure of the 
private market to be managed. With regard to technological innovation, 
a useful theory would explain why an agency responds favorably to some 
innovations and unfavorably to others, and the extent to which its 
response is affected by controllable characteristics of the agency, 
such as its structure, procedures, instruments and responsibilities. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the existing l iterature 
relating to the behavior of regulatory agencies in search of 
generalizations that are useful in the sense described above. Most of 
the l iterature surveyed here is not addressed specifically to the 
question of regulatory policy. Some is very general, addressed to the 
properties of all government policymaking processes or even a l l  
decisionmaking organizations. Some is more specific, but addressed to 
organizations other than regulatory agencies.  Indeed, outside of law 
and economics,  social scientists have paid little attention to 
regulation. Consequently, any attempt to suggest in a comprehensive 
fashion how these disciplines might enhance our understanding of the 
regulatory policymaking process must extract inferences from research 
that has been undertaken for other purposes .  
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The focus of the following is the regulatory agency : what 
factors detennine the policies that it adopts . The discussion is 
divided into two parts. The first deals with organic theories of 
regulatory behavior : theories that characterize regulatory agencies as 
a coherent whole, having objectives that they rationally pursue. The 
second focuses on structural theorie s :  explanations of regulatory 
perfonnance that are based on analyzing agencies as collections of 
individuals with conflicting objectives whose behavior is coordinated 
by the selection of operating rules, hierarchies and methods of 
communication. 
ORGANIC THEORIES 
One approach to studying the behavior of organizations is to 
adopt the metaphor that an organization is an individual ,  having 
explicit objectives and choosing among alternative actions on the basis 
of their expected contributions to organizational goals. This approach 
abstracts from the influence that the structure of the organization and 
the experiences of its members may have on organizational outcomes .  It 
also abstracts from the problems of managing the behavior of members of 
an organization so that their performance will be consistent with 
organizational objectives. 
The appeal of so-called rational actor model s  lies in the 
powerful,  empirical ly-testable hypotheses that can be derived from 
their simplistic motivational asswnption. The power of organic 
theorizing is best demonstrated by the microeconomic theory of the 
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firm, which assumes that private businesses are single-mindedly devoted 
to the maximization of some index of their financial succe s s ,  such as 
profits or sales . 
Goal-directed theories are not universally accepted. Before 
proceeding with a detailed discussion of them, a f ew remarks about the 
critics of these theories are in order. 
Most of the criticisms of rational-actor theories are 
essentially commentaries on the failure to consider (1) how goals are 
formulated and ( 2 )  the importance of structural phenomena on behavior. 
In principle, both notions could be important. If one observed 
considerable differences among organizations engaged in the same 
general type of activities, more powerful theoretical predictions might 
be obtained by incorporating goal-formulation and structural features 
into a model of organizational behavior. In the following discussion, 
the process of goal formulation and emendation is accorded attention in 
several of the expositions of various organic theories, while the issue 
of the relationship between structure and performance is examined at 
length in the next section. In the end, whether one should abandon the 
simplicity of the model by incorporating these features rests on the 
empirical success of the simple model in actually providing good 
predictions about organizational behavior. 
Another criticism of organic theories is that the concept of 
organizational goal lacks meaning and therefore should not be an 
admissible assumption in organization theory . Furthermore ,  such 
theories are said to be normatively inadmissible on the grounds that, 
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because they incorrectly assume the presence of an organizational goal, 
researchers necessarily find all organizations inefficient because they 
inevitably uncover some output of the organization that is inconsistent 
with the goal presumed by the researchers (Etzioni, 1 960) . 
The alternative approach proposed by those subscribing to this 
particular criticism is that the objectives of the organization should 
be regarded as whatever the organization is currently doing and, 
according to its members, would like to do now and in the future. The 
normative standards for judging organizational effectiveness should be : 
( 1) whether it can do whatever it now does or wants to do more 
effectively or efficiently by reallocating its resources (Etzioni, 
1 960) and (2) whether it is  succeeding in obtaining sufficient 
resources to do what it is now doing most effectively (Yuchtman and 
Seashore,  1 967) . 
The alternative formulation offered by Etzioni and his 
followers has very little merit. First, it is useful for predicting 
and explaining organizational actions only if it is converted to a 
rational actor theory (Mohr, 1 973) . Once one has observed 
organizational outputs and learned from its members what else they 
would like to do, one has a multidimensional goal for the organization. 
Moreover, the information gained about its goal is useful only if one 
presumes a regularity in goals through changes in time and conditions . 
If the Etzioni approach makes an assumption of regularity, then it 
boils down to an argument that better predictions will be made if one 
is more careful about stating the goal of the organization. If these 
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regularities do not occur, there is little point front an explanatory 
perspective in observing the original goal in the first place, because 
each observation on organizational performance will be associated with 
a different� randomly selected objective. 
From a normative point of view, the two criteria offered by 
Etzioni and his fol lowers raise legitimate questions, but there is no 
reason to exclude others. In particular, citizens and government 
officials outside of a specific bureau can l egitimately choose to judge 
an agency's performance by other standards. From the perspective of an 
analyst , it is a positive, not a normative, proposition to inquire 
whether the behavior of an agency is consistent with a particular 
objective.  The Etzioni model explicitly disal lows questions about 
whether the organization is producing the wrong mix of output. From 
the standpoint of policy formulation and evaluation, such a model is 
essentially useless. 
The remainder of this section discusses several different 
organic, rational actor theories of regulatory agencies. The key 
element of a rational actor theory is the specification of the 
organizational objective. The number of organizational goals that have 
been hypothesized is nearly as large as the number of organization 
theorists -- for an interesting survey of the problem of defining 
organizational goa l s ,  see Mohr ( 1973) . But , with respect to 
regulation, organic theories are usually based upon some form of one of 
three as sumptions about the motives of regulator s :  they seek t o  serve 
the public interest, implicitly maximizing some usually undefined 
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social welfare measure; they try to serve the interests of particular 
client groups, often by creating a legally enforceable cartel 
arrangement in an industry that would otherwise be competitive; or they 
attempt to maximize their own economic rewards or some mea11ure of the 
financial success of their bureau. 
Serving the Public Interest 
A useful point of departure in a catalogue of theories of 
bureaucratic behavior is to consider models based upon the 
straightforward assumption that government agencies seek to maximize 
social welfare or the public interest.  Numerous conceptual models of 
government bureaucratic behavior are based on this assumption. These 
models differ according to their descriptions of how goverument 
officials develop percept.ions of the public interest that they seek to 
serve. Of course, the paradox established by the compensa1:ion 
principle controversy ( Hicks , 1939; Kaldor, 1 93 9 ;  Scitovsky, 1 942) and 
the literature on social choice theory beginning with the possibility 
theorem (Arrow, 1 951) cast grave doubts on the existence of a well­
defined, consistent public interest,  but this does not imp ly any 
fundamental error in public interest theories of bureaucratic behavior . 
As long as officials believe that a public interest bas be1�n defined 
for them and, accordingly , act to serve it, the fact that the public 
interest they perceive lacks interesting normative properties is 
inessential to the positive theory of their behavior . 
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Traditional public interest theories -- those that were in 
general acceptance until around 1960 -- in economics, political science 
and sociology, while emphasizing different aspects of the social 
process, are quite similar in their basic conceptualization of 
bureaucratic behavior. Although the traditional view is no longer 
widely shared, it is a good place to begin. Traditional theory 
provides a benchmark for investigating other theories� Furthermore, 
much of more modern theory is rooted in the traditional approach. 
Traditional sociology, developing from the ideas of Max Weber 
( 1 946) , made few distinctions between publ ic and private organizations. 
It viewed society as requiring the performance of certain functions for 
its survival . Society creates institutions or structures to perform 
these functions (Parsons , 1 960) . Bureaucratic institutions, with 
formal and impersonal rules carried out by professionals whose 
employment is based on expertise and other objective measures of 
competence, are the most effective mechanism for performing essential 
functions (Weber, 1946) . 
Traditional political scientists, naturally focusing on 
government institutions, emphasized the natural separation of 
functions among the branches of the government . Through the workings 
of the democratic process, legislation worked out by compromise and 
bargain among elected representatives reflected the public interest , 
while the development of a career civil service based upon expertise 
provided objectivity and freedom from partisanship in policy 
implementation (Bernstein, 1 955) . 
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Economists, interested in government agencies becaui;e of the 
microeconomic aspects of their policy mandates ,  viewed them as devices 
for correcting inefficiencies arising from various kinds of market 
imperfections: seller concentration, external effects ,  unpredictable 
fluctuations in supply and demand, and so forth. Strangely enough, the 
costs ot government intervention have been systematically examined by 
economists only quite recently (Arrow, 1970; Breyer and MacAvoy, 1974; 
Williamson, 1 970) , despite the discipline ' s  characteristic concern for 
costs and efficiency. Even the most developed current theoretical 
literature in economics on the costs of regulation, the so-c.alled A-J 
effect on the efficiency of resource utilization that ariseg when rate­
of-return regulation is impo sed on profit-seeking enterprise�, is 
otherwise traditional in approach (Averch and Johnson, 1 962;  Baumol and 
Klevorick, 1970) . It assumes that the regulatory process is: adequately 
described as simply l imiting the profits of a firm that posEiesses 
market power, that the costs of determining and enforcing the 
regulatory constraint can be ignored, and that conditions of demand and 
technical change are sufficiently static that the principle effect of 
profit regulation on a firm's efficiency is through a bias in the 
selection of long-term capital investments .  These assumptions are 
remarkably similar to the characteristics of sociological st:ructural­
functionalist theories, which economists have severly criticized 
( Harsanyi, 1969;  Olson, 1971) . They oversimplify the social function 
of an organization and give scant attention to the manner ir:i which it 
establishes and adjusts policies in light of perceptions of the 
response of its environment to its actions and to other sources of 
change (Joskow, 1973;  Burne s s ,  Montgomery and Quirk, l 980a) . 
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Combining the traditional views of all three disciplines, the 
fol lowing characterization of regulatory policy emerges. An essential 
function of a capitalist society is to  limit the inefficiencies arising 
from certain imperfections that can arise in private markets.  One 
purpose of democratically elected legislatures is to detect serious 
market imperfections and establish admini strative agencies to 
ameliorate them. Since these agencies can1 by their decisions, 
generate substantial wealth, they are potential targets for corruption. 
Hence, they must be placed in the hands of experts who are removed from 
partisan politics and made subject to rules for reaching decisions that 
protect the process from bribery. When administrative policy fails, 
the causes can be found among the fol lowing : the administrators are 
poorly selected, being either corrupt or inexpert (Bernstein, 1 955; 
Cary, 1967) ; the legislative mandate is faulty, either because it 
lacks clarity or because subsequent events have outdated it (Friendly, 
1 962) ; the agency has too few resources to implement its policy 
directive effectively (Cary, 1967) ; or the agency has been given a 
combination of objectives and powers that are incommensurate -- a 
mismatch of means and ends (Breyer, 1981) . Solutions include better 
appointments, which may require giving the agency more prestige or 
greater insulation from corrupting influences ,  clear legislative 
mandates that are regularly reviewed, such as by including an 
expiration date in all legislation that creates an administrative 
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agency, and increases in agency budget s .  
The traditiona 1 approach to the behavior o f  regulatory agencies 
has many weaknesses which are sufficiently obvious that they need not 
be elaborated. But those that stand out as particularly important 
should be emphasized. 
First is the acceptance of the possibility of making a clear 
separation between policymaking and policy implementation, the former 
by political actors and the latter by experts. The need for expert 
policy implementation arises from the difficulties of establishing 
causal connections between policy actions and performance outcomes 
(March and Simon , 1 958) . To the extent that expert judgment: i s  relied 
upon f or estimates of the relationships between actions and outcomes, 
the actual policymaking authority resides at least in part in the 
expert ( Bendix, 1 968; Etzioni, 1 95 9) . The experts' control over 
information and access to sophisticated analytic techniques enables 
them to vitiate to some degree an attempt to alter policy objectives 
through clarifying and tightening the mandate. In fac t ,  judging from 
the language of the laws that establish regulatory agencies, it is not 
apparent that Congress conceives of itself as doing more th�1n setting 
loose guidelines within which policy will be formulated by the agency 
(Lowi, 1969) . In general, agencies are admonished to serve an 
undefined public interest and given a conf licting set of general policy 
directions. To the extent that expert judgment is an essential 
ingredient to rational policy formulation, such behavior from Congress 
is to be expected. 
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At  the same time, Congress hardly demonstrates a lack of 
interest in specific cases involving important constituents. Because 
Congress controls the budget and legislative authority of the agency, it 
can and does override expert judgments by the agency ( Green and 
Rosenthal ,  1963 , g_ the AEC ; Scher, 1960, .rg_ the NLRB; Weingast , 1982,
g the FTC ) .
Second the traditional theory provides no logical foundation 
for the presumption that governmental organizations are inherently 
efficient ( Blau and Scott, 1962) . In economics, the assumption that 
the internal structure of the firm can be overlooked rests on the 
argument that, in competition, only efficiently organized f irms wil l 
survive. Economists have recognized that the assumption of internal 
efficiency may not be satisf ied in imperfectly competitive markets , and 
Leibenstein's ( 1 966) empirical work argues for the presence of 
considerable internal inefficiency. By the same logic, the 
monopolistic position enjoyed by most agencies - rarely do two 
agencies perform the same service -- could lead to the same type of 
organizational slack. The insulation of agencies from markets for their 
outputs or equities should leave them with less incentive than a 
private monopolistic firm to operate efficiently. Moreover, the 
interests of legislators in providing ombudsman services to 
constituents as a means for securing reelection can lead the 
legislature purpo sely to create excessively bureaucratic processes that 
provide opportunities for intervention by legislators (Fiorina and 
Nol l ,  1978) . For example, the legislation establ ishing the Consumer 
Product Safety Connnission appears designed to produce an inefficient 
process (Corne l l ,  Noll and Weingast, 1 976) . At best , the Weberian 
criteria for effective bureaucratic organizations are no more than 
necessary conditions for efficient operation. 
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In order for the public interest theory t o  be viable, it must 
have two components that are lacking in the traditional theo1ry. It 
must include a model of how an agency comes to perceive the public 
interest and it must identify the source of an agency' s  motivation to 
pursue that objective with some degree of efficiency. Part of the 
motivational argument rests on the l imitations for improving personal 
welfare in the government service.  It is the contention of 1nuch of the 
literature in public administration that the income, status and rate of 
advancement o:f government employees, particularly in higher 
policymaking jobs, is largely determined by tenure in office, not 
performance (Bendix, 1 949; Warner, et a l . ,  1963) . I f  so, secondary 
motivations, of which only one possibility is identifying and. serving 
some public interest objective not associated with personal well-being , 
can dominate decision-making even by individual s  who are normally 
driven by rational self-interest (Tullock , 1 965) . 
Comanor and Mitchell ( 1972) have suppl ied one such motive. 
They contend that the Federal Communications Commission regards itself 
as an economic planning agency, basing their argument upon the 
generality of its legislative mandate. As a theory, however, their 
model is tautological ,  because it lacks an explanation of how public 
interest planning objectives are discovered. Since it would be 
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impossible for an administrative agency to have absolutely no effect on 
resource allocation -- even if it were totally ineffectiveJ resources 
would still be devoted to operating it -- the assertion that agencies 
engage in economic planning is incapable of disproof unless the purpose 
of the plans is specified. Once again, the essential ingredient of a 
theory is missing. 
The obvious places to look for sources of a perception of the 
public interest are the institutions that in American society have some 
legitimate claim to speak for the public -- elected representatives, 
the press, the courts and leaders of broadly-based organizations. We 
will return to these external sources of objectives at the end of this 
section. 
Capture-Cartel Theories 
In contrast to the traditional view that bureaus attempt to 
serve the general welfare are theories that view bureaus as servants of 
some well-defined interest, either because the agency was set up to 
serve that client -- the cartel theory -- or because, through the 
years, agencies are vulnerable to being taken over by some special 
interest -- the capture theory. The special interest group that the 
organization serves is usually identified as the producers in the 
market the agency administers, although occasionally the agency's 
principal client has been said to be a professional elite, such as 
lawyers in the agencies with cumbersome procedures or physicists in 
the case of the old Atomic Energy Commission. 
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Marxist Theories. The Marxian perception of politics, which 
vests political control in the hands of those who control economic 
production, provides the simplest cartel theory. It sees American 
government as an instrument for protecting capitalist interests, with 
revolution bt�ing the only means of creating a government interested in 
the welfare of the working class. It follows without further argument 
that regulatory agencies are agents for increasing the wealth of 
producers, usually by establishing a legally enforceable cartel. 
The Marxist argument has been used to explain the birth of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the regulation of railroads (Kalka, 
1965, whose Marxism is explicit, and MacAvoy, 196 5 ,  whose a111alysis is 
not explicitly Marxist but is consistent with Kolko's). The: argument 
here is not without controversy, however; whereas regulatio11: may have 
benefited railroads by establishing a cartel, it imposed cos.ts on 
anotner corporate sector -·- manufacturing -- and probably benefitted 
rural agriculture and consumers (Spann and Erikson, 1 970) . Similar 
though more complicated ca.sea have been made regarding regulation of 
banking and airlines (Davis and North, 1970) and professional licensure 
(Stigler, 1 971) . 
Unfoirtunately, the Marxist cartel theory has several fatal flaws. 
It can provide no explanation for the few instances when regulation has 
been imposed on an industry against its will, such as goverrmi.ent 
controls on coal mine safety, automobile safety and emissions, toy 
safety, pay television, the siting of electric power generation 
facilities and performance standards for medical instrumentE1. Nor 
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does it provide an explanation for the cases where industries have 
tried but failed, at least to date, to obtain an effective cartel, such 
as commuter airlines, wholesale and retail trade, and hospitals . It 
offers no explanation for agency policies that clearly run counter to 
producer interests in industries in which regulation is nevertheless 
generally favored . Railroads , for example, have favored innovations 
that were blunted or delayed by the ICC, such as the unit train, the 
piggyback flat car and the Big John hopper car (Gellman, 1 971) . More 
generally, some have argued that the principal beneficiaries of the 
regulation ot several industries -- notably construction and trucking 
-- are employees. It has nothing to say about administrative agencies 
that referee conflicts among producer groups, such as Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission regulation of the field price of natural gas , 
Federal Communications Commission regulation of the prices for 
interconnecting television networks or Bureau of Land Management 
control of the uses of public lands . Finally, it can not explain the 
deregulation of the 1970s in airlines1  banking, securities and 
communications in which anticompetitive policies were abandoned .  
The flaws i n  the simple cartel theory arise from its 
dichotomization of society into two interest groups, capitalists and 
workers. Only by adopting a more complicated model of society as a 
complex combination of numerous interests can one explain the diversity 
of regulatory institutions. Because more often than not regulatory 
agencies deal with policy issues having far more complexity than a 
simple conflict between capitalists and workers, Marxist theory i s  not 
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really appropriate for examining and explaining their behavior. 
The Market for Regulation. Another cartel theory applies the 
economists' model of a market to the supply and demand of regulatory 
institutions ( Stigler, 1 97.l; and Peltzman, 1976) . The presumption is 
that all producer groups stand to benef it from institutionalized 
protection from competition. The magnitude of the potential benefit 
creates a maximum payment the group is willing to make to  legislators 
in order to obtain the institution. On the other side, legii:;lators, 
seeking reelection1 would like to confer benefits on voters and 
potential campaign contributors that would increase their 
reelectability. They are therefore willing to confer institutionalized 
protection from competitio11 on the interest group only if the political 
costs of reducing competition are offset by political benefits flowing 
from the group's purchase of the institut ional change. The currencies 
for this transaction are numerous : they may be direct payments in cash 
or in votes if the group is large enough to matter, or they may be 
indirect through improvements in seivice quality or the provision of 
uneconomic se��ices to designated constituents of key legislators
(Posner, 1971) . 
Political scientists have often thought of legislato:rs as 
engaged in conferring private benefits on selected constituents 
(Mayhew, 1 974; and Fiorina, 1 977)  and numerous empirical studies 
provide support for this view (Cary, 1967; Ferejohn, 1974; g,�her, 
1960) . The political science view is more dynamic than Stigler's. The 
latter fonnally presents only a theory of the establishment •::>f an 
agency, implicitly presuming that agencies behave as originally 
intended � the common presumption that the regulatory process is 
perfectly controlled and efficient, despite its insulation from a 
market test. The political science view focuses more on the steady 
stream of pressures for favors from legislators during the operating 
life of the agency . 
24 
Although few political scientists subscribe to Stigler's 
approach, their work on the role of private favors in legislative 
activities can be used to make Stigler' a theory more dynamic. The 
result is a description of the regulatory process along the following 
line s :  a producer group transmits a continual flow of requests to key 
legislators, usually those in the relevant subcommittees, who in turn 
pressure a regulatory agency to provide more institutionalized 
protection from competition. The legislator applies the pressure if 
the group agrees to certain other conditions in terms of direct and 
indirect political favor s .  The agency� responding to the directions of 
the legislator, obliges. 
The preceding explanation of regulatory behavior has several 
problems .  One is that ,it is tautological : it assumes its conclusion 
by presuming the existence of suppliers, demanders and an 
equilibrium between the two. It is impossible to conceive of a market 
managed by a regulatory agency that i s  as efficient as either a perfect 
cartel with legally enforceable rules or a perfectly competitive 
industry. Because everything else can be construed as a willful 
redistribution of income that s tands at the intersection of 
institutional demand and supply, the theory is incapable of disproof. 
To escape the tautology it must include some explanation of why 
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certain groups receive benefits as successful purchasers of 
institutional protections, while still others receive no benefits at 
all but bear some costs through the economic inefficiencies of 
administrative management, as well as the factors that determine the 
relative sizes of these amounts .  This explanation inevitably reduces 
to a theory of the emergence of political issues relevant to regulatory 
policies and of the relationship between interest-group characteristics 
and the effectiveness of  groups in the political decisionmaking 
process .  An explanation of why these factors lead to cartE�lization is 
not to be found in the cartel-theory literature, other than the 
inadequate simplification of Marxist theory. 
Another problem is that it is not a theory of regulation, but a 
theory of government policy. Indeed, in Stigler's original paper 
almost all policies are called regulation, and his approach is really 
to view laws as a kind of commodity that is sold to the highest bidder. 
The theory has not developed as systemmatic analysis of why an interest 
group picks regulation as its source of public assistance. 
Goal-Deflection in Bureaus 
The goal-deflection model of agency capture stands between the 
other capture-cartel theories and the traditional public i1�terest view. 
It postulates a concern within agencies to serve a broad p1Llblic 
purpose but predicts goal deflection as the agency builds up relations 
with external clients and as the agency, through experience, comes to 
rely upon certain types of professional employees. 
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Conflict-Avoidance and Producer Capture . Goals become 
deflected in favor of producer interest s ,  according to this theory, 
because agency personnel develop symbiotic relationships with their 
principal client group. The usual explanation for the development of a 
symbiosis lies in the desire to avoid conflict . 
Administrative agencies see in producers potential allies in 
dealing with government budgeters (Wildavsky, 1964) or, what amount s  
to  the same thing , a s  potential threats to  the survival of the 
organization (Thompson and McEwan , 1 958) . Or perhaps both sides just 
prefer to avoid conflict with those with whom each is in constant 
contact (Gouldner, 1959) . The result is a compromise of objectives 
between organizations. Neither organization remains as free to pursue 
its original objective, but in return both achieve regularity and 
predictability in their relationship as well as a reduction in 
conflict . 
The feature of this theory that goes beyond the public interest 
theories is the value it presumes in regularization of 
interorganizational relationships.  In the goal-deflection theory the 
existence of the original goal, like original sin, is accepted as an 
act of faith, much as in the traditional theories of administrative 
behavior. But acts to reduce conflict and tension represent an 
additional factor not derivable from the public interest theories. An 
agency, according to the theory, will consciously alter its objectives 
to regularize relationships, perhaps because an agency can function 
more eff iciently in the absence of conf l ict . Similarly, client 
organizations will bend their own actions to accommodate agE!ncies, 
abandoning to  some degree their profit orientation. 
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The most persuasive statements of this theory are in the 
context of two-way relationships.  The importance of conf lict-avoidance 
in a more complicated environment in which an agency is int•erposed 
between opposing organizations with unavoidable and perpetual conf licts 
of interest is less persuasively argued and certainly yet to be 
established empirically. 
Internal Goal-Deflection and Lawyer Dominance . The second type 
of goal-deflection theory sees organizational goals being bent 
according to the interests and values of an elitist group in the 
organization. Perrow ( 1 963) , based on the observation that doctors 
tend to dominate policy decisions in hospitals,  hypothesizE�d that an 
internal group will control an organization if the service11 of its 
members are crucial to the success of the organization and if the group 
is the most skilled, highest status, most difficult to replace 
occupational group in the organization. 
This theory goes beyond the normal economic predictions about 
monopol ized factor markets,  such as the Pauley-Redisch ( 1 973) 
hypothesis that hospitals are essentially a physician's cooperative,  
for the theory contends that the key group will dominate organizational 
decisions on matters not closely related to its own welfare. For the 
present, we will abstract from the market imperfection effects and deal 
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with key-factor dominance as a determinant of organizational objectives 
unrelated to the welfare of particular types of organization members. 
While the applicability of this theory to organizations producing 
private goods for competitive markets is certainly subject to serious 
question, it nevertheless is a serious candidate for explaining some of 
the behavior of institutions that are insulated from competition in 
product markets and, therefore, that can survive with considerable 
organizational slack or x-inefficiency, such as government bureaus or 
regulated monopolies. 
Lawyers ,  who hold many key positions in regulatory agencies, 
clearly satisfy the conditions f or key-factor dominance.  Their 
services are essential to the operation of quasi-judicial processes. 
They are a highly skilled and well-organized professional elite. 
Members of such professional groups,  according to a substantial 
amount of sociological research, tend to be motivated in large measure 
by extra-organizational standards of their profession rather than by 
the objectives of the organization with which they are aff iliated ( Blau 
and Scott, 1 962) . Lawyers are trained to be concerned about the 
maintenance of due process, the protection of private equities and the 
ability of a system to achieve consensus . These concerns are not as 
dominant in other professional groups, al though they appear in 
political science. For example,  Lindblom' a (1959) attack on benefit­
cost analysis as a budgeting system is based upon its failure to 
account for these values. 
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The desire among lawyers to adhere to professional norms and to 
attain peer-group approval leads to a particular kind of goal and a 
motive to be efficient in achieving i t .  Peer-group approval will 
depend upon the extent to which the performance of the agency 
corresponds to the legal profession's measures of success including 
winning court challenges to agency decisions. This in turn will 
depend upon the extent to which the agency collects information and 
develops decisionmaking procedures that comport with the legal 
profession's conceptualization of a fair process. The elements of a 
fair process include adherence to legal rules of evidence and the 
dependence o:f decisions on evidence.  
Another motive £01: developing fair procedures could be that
they contribute to the psychological well-being of those wh() stand to 
lose . Michelman ( 1967) has hypothesized that arbitrary, capricious 
redistributions of income impose demoralization costs on the losers 
that is, they will take unproductive defensive actions against further 
redistributions, reduce their own productivity, or even seek revenge 
through destructive acts if they are not compensated. Williamson 
( 1 970) has incorporated the concept into a general model of optimal 
intervention into market failures, where intervention precedes to the 
point where administrative costs and inefficiencies are balanced, at the 
margin, with the reduction in demoralization costs they bring about . 
The mode can easily be extended to incorporate the additional dimension 
of fairness  postulated above -- that demoralization effects are reduced 
if losers lose in a fair process rather than if they lose in an unfair, 
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capricious one. Of course,  while this is a clever, useful way to 
conceptualize how fairness  enters into an efficiency argument, it seems 
to lack much operational importance. Demoraization costs can rarely 
be measured . In the end , this analysis cannot escape the absence of a 
metric for comparing fairness and economic efficiencyD 
A system that places a value that is independent of the outcome 
on decisionmaking processes having certain procedural characteristics 
creates inefficiency in the economist's sense of the term because a 
process that satisfies the lawyer's conception of fairness may not be 
the least expensive method for achieving the same policy outcome. This 
is not to argue that lawyers are indifferent to the procedural costs of 
decisionmaking, although there may be an element of this -- where an 
economist perceives a procedural cost a lawyer sees income. But even 
if lawyers who run administrative agencies attempt to achieve given 
degrees of institutionalized protection of private equities and of 
procedural nicety for minimum feasible cost, the performance of the 
managed market will still fail a test of economic efficiency. 
To the extent that lawyers seek to  preserve private equities 
through institutional protections rather than direct financial 
compensation, regulatory policy also leads to economic efficiencies in 
the performance of the regulated market� For example, the adoption of a 
new technology may be delayed while the agency determines its impact on 
each of the buyers and sellers of the service and develops a procedure 
for gradually adopting the new method in a manner that minimizes the 
losses of those with investments in the old method. This generates an 
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incentive to  produce innovations that avoid the regulatory process or 
that do not threaten the existing distribution of wealth. While in 
terms of economic efficiency these effects may generate far greater 
costs from benef its,  in terms of legal efficiency -- the extent to 
which private equities are protected and high procedural standards are 
maintained -- the process may be exemplary. 
A lawyer-dominated system also creates problems of �1elective 
representation of interests in the decisionmaking process (Noll, 
197la) . Among the characteristics of a procedural system that meshes 
with the values of lawyers are decisions based upon formal E�vidence 
admitted only according to strict rules, among them the right to rebut 
opposing arguments in an adversary proces s .  Participation i n  such a 
process i s  expensive. Hence, the effectiveness of a group in having 
its private equities preserved depends upon the resources i t  has 
available to represent it in the decisiorunaking proces s .  Not all 
private equities of equal size wil l have equal representation. 
Generally, tine smaller the group i s ,  the higher is the per capita stake 
of the group members in the issue, and the more dependent is the 
success of the group on the participation of each member, then the 
greater is the likelihood that the group wil l become organi�:ed to 
represent its interests in a regulatory proceeding (Olson, J.965) . To 
the extent that decisions depend upon the information derived from the 
regulatory process,  the uneven representation of interests will lead to 
uneven concern for private equities. This causes a bias against change 
-- new policies, new organizations, new technologies -- in agency 
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decisions. Because of the uncertainties attendant t o  a proposed 
change, some potential beneficiaries are l ikely to be unaware that they 
stand to gain from i t .  Consequently, they will not b e  as well 
organized as other groups with equal stakes, and some private equities 
will not even be represented. Furthermore ,  the rules of evidence will 
downgrade the conjectural information about the potential benefits of 
change in comparison with the more certain informa tion about 
establ ished methods and institutions, and the equities depending on 
their continuation. And, because the interests of consumers are widely 
diffused, they are also less l ikely to be effectively represented in 
the adversary process. This is a further bias against change insofar 
as its potential benefits in the end derive from consumer demand for 
the products affected by the innovation. 
Perhaps the most important effect of lawyer-dominated agencies 
is the response they engender in private organizations.  The more a 
private organization f inds itself involved in regulatory proceedings 
which strongly influence its well-being, the more likely are lawyers to 
dominate that organization as wel l .  I n  the extreme case in which 
agencies are willing to insulate a private organization from 
competition, success in dealing with government officials can be a far 
more important factor affecting the firm than the efficiency of its 
operations. For industry, the development of legal strategies becomes 
the most important ousiness activity, and persons who are especially 
adept at executing these strategies rise to the top of the firm. For 
society as a whole, the effect is to increase the demand for lawyers ,  
thereby sucking off a share of the most intelligent, creative minds 
into what is essentially an economically unproductive activity -- the 
care and feeding of government regulator s .  
The lawyer-dominance theory leaves many questions unanswered. 
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Most important is the issue of its significance. Presumab ly this could 
be estimated at least qualitatively by comparing the performance of 
lawyer-domina ted agencies and industries with those that appear not t o  
b e  lawyer dominated, such a s  the institutions that manage medical care, 
agricultural production and atomic energy. With respect to the last , 
the Atomic Energy Commission appears to have been controlled primarily 
by scientists and engineers� The objectives of the agency appear t o  
have been related t o  the key role o f  scientists. Its promotion of 
peaceful uses of atomic energy increased the demand for sciJEintists and 
engine er s ,  and contributed to assuaging the scientific comm.11.m.ity"s 
lingering doubts about its participation in the development of atomic 
weapons .  Also, procedures and private equities were less i mportant 
concerns a t  the AEC than .at other independent commissions until the 
rise of the environmental movement introduced serious conflict into AEC 
proceeding s .  
Another important issue is the cause of lawyer dominance. Some 
attention to legal process is  necessary, of course, because of 
constitutional protections of private property, guarantee of due 
process and provision for the right to petition for redress of grievances. 
But agencies differ in the formality of their process, and some 
agencies are not dominated by lawyers .  Hence, the question arises 
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whether lawyer dominance is systematically related to some other 
feature of policy responsibility. It is possible that lawyer dominance 
just happens to be built into most agencies simply because the Congress 
includes many lawyers, and that the exceptions are anomalies. It is 
also possible that lawyer dominance is an effect of environmental 
factors that influence an agency's development over time. Lawyers may 
be observed to attain a dominant position in an agency because its 
responsibilities include resolving conflicts among several well­
represented interests , l eading it to adopt procedures and objectives 
that generate a demand for lawyers' skills in key pol icymaking 
positions {Eisenstadt , 1958) . The absence of lawyer-dominance for two 
decades in the AEC, for example,  may have been a result of the fact 
that until the late 1 960s there were really not any significant 
private equities to be preserved in the nuclear energy business nor any 
serious conflicts over the technology. Or the removal of AEC 
regulatory powers to a specialized agency, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, may have served to cut off some technical personnel from 
these policies, leaving the field easier for lawyers to dominate . 
The Bureau as Enterprise 
Another major theoretical approach to an organic theory of 
administrative behavior pictures an agency as having motivations 
similar to those of a private entrepreneur . 
Budget-Based Theories. The most common approach is to assume 
that the agency attempts to maximize its budget (McKeanJ 1 964;  
Niskanen, 1 97 1 ;  Wildavsky, 1964) . From this assumption, two general 
types of conclusions have been reached. 
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One set of conclusions follows from the observation that the 
budget-maximizing agency is roughly equivalent to a revenue-maximizing 
private enterprise, so that theoretical implications of the latter have 
counterparts in the theory of the former. The firm that maximizes 
total revenue , subject to the condition that its profits not fall below 
some minimum level ,  will,  from the standpoint of economic efficiency, 
produce too much output if it exhibits decreasing returns to scale and 
operates in a market that is not perfectly competitive {Baumo l ,  1967) . 
Such a f irm increases output to the point where price equals average 
cost, which, incidentally, is the objective that is normal ly assumed 
for public utility regulation {Baumol and Klevorick, 1970) , uhereas 
optimal pricing from an economic efficiency standpoint depends upon the 
relationship between price and marginal costs {Baumol and Bradford, 
1 970;  Dixi t ,  1970 ) .  By similar argument, the conclusion is reached 
that a budget-maximizing bureau will,  in the presence of inc1:easing 
returns, produce more service and obtain a larger budget than is 
economically efficient {Niskanen, 1 97 1 ) . 
This conclusion depends upon the assumptions made about the 
relative bargaining power of an agency compared to budget 
decisionmakers. As Niskanen points out, whereas a bureau is normally a 
monopo listic supplier of its service) so, too, is the legislature a 
monopolistic demander. If the legislature is totally passiv4�, 
exploiting none of its bargaining power, the revenue-maximizing bureau 
will expand until the social value of the agency, as measured by the 
legislators; demand, is zero; that is , it extracts sufficient budget 
from the legislature so that the latter is indifferent between 
abolishing the agency and continuing it at its current cost . If the 
agency and legislature have roughly equal bargaining strengths, one 
possible result is the one that would prevail under competition -- an 
agency of optimal size. 
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The second set of theoretical conclusions is derived from 
assumptions about the factors that influence the relative bargaining 
strengths of agencies and budgeters. In general , these ideas 
constitute argument s  in support of the proposition that agencies have 
greater bargaining power than budgeters and hence are l ikely to be too 
large. They fall into the following general categories : 
1 .  Budget Complexity. The budget of the entire government 
must be considered by budgetary decision-makers, while an agency 
considers only its own budget. Because the overall complexity of the 
budget is so great, budgeters can devote little attention to the 
particulars of the budget of most agencies . They respond by developing 
automatic rules of thumb for most budget items, examining only a few 
with care in any budget cycle (Wildavsky , 1 964; Wol l ,  1963) . 
2 .  Building a Clientele. Recognizing the sensitivity of 
legislators to special interest lobbies , an agency can increase its 
bargaining strength by creating wealth among some well-defined, 
organized group whose well-being wil l be l inked to the size of the 
agency;s budget ( Somers ,  1965;  Wildavsky, 1964) . Conversely, the best 
strategy for a private organization is to work out a symbiotic 
relationship with its overseeing agency . 
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3 .  Control of Information. Agencies are expert on their own 
activities and control the flow of most of the information relevant to 
evaluating their budgetary requests.  This allows subjective opinions 
to be masqueraded as objective facts and gives an agency the 
opportunity to present a restricted list of alternatives that makes 
the policies they propose appear more desirable (Danziger, 1974; March 
and Simon, 1958; Wildavsky, 1964) . 
4 .  Private Favors . A legislator normally desires special 
favors for lhis constituents. An agency can increase its budget by 
working out special favors for those who support its overall budget 
request (Ferejohn, 1974; Wildavsky, 1964) . 
5 .  Competition for Control .  Whereas the agency n()rmally 
possesses a monopoly in its service, Congress and the executive may 
compete for control of agency policy; the executive may approve a 
budget it does not expect Congress to approve in order to c:urry favor ; 
the Congress may exceed the executive request for similar 1reasons 
(Sayre, 1965) . 
While these arguments all  establish plausible inde:pendent 
effects, they do not sum to proof that the agency has supe:rior 
bargaining power . For example,  the argument about the diffused budget 
process can cut both ways. Each agency budget is reviewed by two 
budget, two author ization and two appropriation committees, the first 
and last with more broadly based financial responsibilities that lead 
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them t o  have relatively greater concern for overall spending . 
Furthermore,  the sequential process of budget determination stil l 
yields one final budget figure, not separate contributions from 
different committees for different purpose s .  I n  such a decisionmaking 
process, the distribution of all individuals having a vote among the 
various committees considering the proposal and the sequence in which 
connnittees vote can have a major effect on the outcome ( Shepsle, 1979) . 
The fact that for most agencies the appropriations stage produces the 
binding figure probably reduces the bargaining power of the agency. 
This is consistent with the general belief that program budgets are 
higher with back-door financing � programs in which the appropriations 
committees have little influence because the authority to commit 
federal funds is made prior to  appropriations (Plot t ,  1 968) . 
The competition for control between executive and legislative 
branches could lead to higher budgets, but it will occur only when both 
branches f ind it worthwhile to control the agency . But , for reasons 
given in point ( ! ) , most agencies are not carefully scrutinized by 
Congress or the Executive Office of the President , in part because 
there is little to gain politically from controlling them (Cary, 1967) . 
Another feature of the theory that is open to serious doubt is 
its presumption that the proper characterization of the budgetary 
process is conflict resolution between agencies and Congress . If 
Congre ss, too, likes to build alliances with client groups through 
regulatory provision of private favor s ,  the desires of the agency for 
larger budgets mesh with the desires of Congress to provide favors. In 
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this milieu the budget becomes a competition among agencies for 
developing client groups,  regardless of the function of the agency. 
Assuming that the specific identity of the source of votes and campaign 
contributions does not affect their value, the monopolistic functional 
division of responsibilities may be without operative significance 
particularly in a process in which the budgets are, in genei:·al , 
detennined by appropriations committees who will be in a better 
position than authorizations committees to trade the intere1;ts of one 
functional client group for the favor of another. 
The welfare implications for the budget-maximizing bureau that 
parallel those for the revenue-maximizing finn are also subject to  
question. Welfare implications of price and output behavio·r in private 
markets  are based on the derivation of market supply and demand 
schedules from actual resource costs and consumer preferences. 
Advocates of the budget-maximization theory make the point that the 
state of knowledge about the true resource costs of programs is obscure 
at best and may even be intentionally clouded as part of rational 
bureaucratic behavior (Wildavsky, 1964) . But the theory's advocates 
have not fully realized that on the demand side, too, the connection 
between a Congressional willingness to budget and voter welfare is 
tenuous. Legislator prerogatives ,  or agreements that within limits 
certain personal favors can be accorded each legislator without review 
by his peer s ,  make the acquisition of some favors of zero cost to 
legislators, so that the marginal value of expenditures on favors need 
not equal that for other public services (Ferejohn , 1974) . 
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Furthennore, because of the nature of collective choice institutions , 
the stability and regularity of political outcomes do not require the 
attainment of even the existence of a political counterpart to general 
economic equil ibrium. Consequently , the presumpt ion that the expressed 
preferences of a legislature reveal information about the relative 
benefits at the margin of alternative public and private goods is 
without theoretical foundation (Plott, 1972) . This means that the 
difference in output between a budget-maximizing and prof it-maximizing 
bureau has, by itself, no normat ive significance. 
The budget maximization hypothesis yields several predictions 
about the behavior of regulatory agencies that do not depend on its 
questionable assumptions about the behavior of budget decisionmakers, 
the bargaining process and the welfare implications of the model .  In 
general, a budget-maximizing agency should react favorably to 
possibilities for expanding its sphere of control. In particular, 
opportunities for expanding the number of regulated markets should be 
regarded with favor, because they increase the workload of the agency 
and expand the number of client s .  One would also expect budget­
maximizing agencies to prefer to regulate competitive industries. More 
f irms means that administering market behavior requires more resources. 
And more firms means a more loyal clientele because competition 
creates the greatest dependence of the industry on regulation to 
generate profits that exceed the normal earnings of competitive firms. 
The actual behavior of regulatory agencies does not appear to 
fit these predictions . 
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Agencies have of ten opposed proposals to expand their 
responsibilities : examples are the Federal Power Commissi0Il1 and 
natural gas field prices, and the Food and Drug Admini stration and toy 
safety. Agencies appear to prefer fewer firms rather than mor e :  for 
example,  the promotion of mergers by the CAB and ICC, the receptive 
attitude of the Department of Interior to joint ventures in oil 
production on federal lands and the opposition of the Federal 
Communication Commission to pay television, cable television and 
spectrum reallocation, all of which could be used to expand 
broadcast ing. Historical ly , eXtensions of authority have often been a 
reluctant response to the emergence of an unregulated, compe titive 
threat to the structure of an industry that the agency has created, 
such as the movement of the FCC into cable television regulation 
because it threatened the agency' s  plans for broadcasting (Noll,  Peck 
and McGowan , 1 973) . Of course, because inefficiency attracts compe titive 
entry, agencies f ind the expansion of their responsibilities a 
continuing necessity (McKie, 1970) . 
The budget-maximization theory also predicts a tendE!ncy of 
administrative agencies to adopt formal ized, lengthy procedu1res for 
reaching decisions because these , too, raise the costs of pe.rforming 
administrative tasks. But this leads to a dilemma. If Cong,ress 
permits expenditures to  grow in order to f inance adversary procedures 
only when an agency is often called upon to resolve conflicts among 
represented groups, then agencies should have an incentive for creating 
conflict. This conclusion is  at  variance with the findings of most of 
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the sociological research on bureaus and the observation of economists 
that agency's generally oppose new entrants with new technology. On 
the other hand, if Congress does not evaluate the necessity for 
formalized procedures on the basis of the existence of conflict, the 
presence of formalized procedures should not vary systematically with 
the existence of conf lict among agencies -- the former wil l be sought 
regardless of the relevance of a conflict-resolution system. In fact , 
formalized procedures are highly correlated with the presence of 
conflict. At the FCC, for example, a formal inquiry into the pricing 
of interstate telecommunications prices was not held for over thirty 
years, while during the same period elaborate procedures were developed 
and continually amended with respect to competitive hearings for 
broadcast licenses. For licenses that are not limited in number or 
that are merely sold through competitive bidding, procedures are not so 
legally formalized, such as certifications that qualify housing for FHA 
or VA loan guarantee insurance, rights to  log in national forests or 
CB and amateur radio licenses at the FCC. 
The strength of budget-based theories depends in part on their 
ability to characterize accurately the budgeting process -- the focus 
of most of the above criticisms -- and in part on the validity of the 
simplifying assumption that budget is all that matters or is close 
enough to being all that matters to al low the simplified theory to make 
accurate predictions (Niskanen, 1971) . 
In the case of regulatory agencies , the theory just does not 
seem to work. These agencies have relatively small,  stable budgets 
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and very little programmatic responsibility. This sets them apart from 
superagencies such as the Department of Defense or the Department of 
Health and Human Services, which are the agencies that authors such as 
Niskanen ( 1 97 1 )  and Wildavsky ( 1 964) have in mind when theorizing about 
the budgetary proce s s .  Perhaps differences in agency purposes -­
buying or producing a service versus regulating a private market -­
give rise to different modes of behavior. 
Some of the inadequacies of budget-based theories might be 
overcome if J:evenue-maximization (Mique and Belanger, 1 974) . Suppose 
that agencies maximize their discretionary budget -- or at least a 
weighted sum of budgetary components that f avors discretionary funds 
where discretionary funds are the parts of the budget that the 
administrators of the agency are free to spend on themselves. Because 
administrators normal ly have salaries f ixed by office and tenure,  
opportunities for increasing salary income are small.  But 
administrators can receive some other types of income : a travel 
budget,  a chauffered car, a large staff, a nicely decorated office and 
a fund to spend on friends through advisory groups, conferen.ces, 
consultantships and so forth. When an agency has the opportunity to 
expand the domain of its authority, it might react according to  the 
expected difference between the increase in revenues and the added 
costs associated with the new activity. Included among the benefits 
might be the budgetry reductions that might be made if the old client 
group was adversely affected by the new responsibility, either because 
its interests might conflict with the new client or because its affairs 
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might receive less attention if the new responsibility were added. 
The Venal Administrator. Another approach to viewing the 
agency as an enterprise is the theory that agencies are operated to 
maximize the permanent income of administrative heads . In some 
instances this is taken to mean that commissioners are simply bought 
and paid for by the industries they regulate (Schwart z ,  1 959) . But, 
because the amount of money involved in most of the famous regulation 
scandals is so small, it seems unlikely that payoff a are the cause of a 
commission favoring a particular group so much as they are simple 
expressions of gratitude among friends of long standing . A more subtle 
version of this theory involves an analysis of the career opportunities 
of administrators. Because opportunities for increases in income while 
in the federal service are limited ,  agencies can be a vehicle for 
obtaining better employment in the private sector. A high-level 
official of a regulatory agency develops specialized skills regarding the 
operation of the regulatory process that are highly valued by regulated 
firms. Hence, regulatory officials, when their on-the-job training is 
complete, will take poaitions with the f irms whose behavior they 
formerly regulated or with profes sional firms law, consulting, 
engineering -- who assist the regulated f irms in representing 
themselves in regulatory proceedings. Their behavior while in the 
service of the agency will be oriented towards obtaining these more 
lucrative private sector positions, leading admini strators to devote 
considerable effort to developing cordial relations with regulated 
firms (Eckert, 1972) . While this behavior falls short of capture --
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obviously some independence of mind and show of integrity is necessary 
to appear as an attractive future employee -- the predicted result is 
an agency operated in large measure in the interests of the regulated 
industry. 
The empirical support for this position resides mainly in 
demonstrations of the free flow of personnel between adminii;trative 
agencies and f irms in the managed industry (Eckert, 1972; Nol l ,  Peck 
and McGowan, 1973; U . S. Senate Conunittee on Government Operations, 
1 977) . What has yet to be demonstrated is any connection between the 
observed employment pattern and the decisions made by regul.<itory 
officials. For exampl e ,  no study has been made showing sys1temmatic 
differences in voting behavior among commissioners in a regulatory 
agency according to their employment histories before and after their 
terms of goverrnnent service. 
Probably the most interesting prediction derived from the 
permanent income theory relates to the planning horizon of the agency. 
Because officials expect to f ind greener, private pastures before too 
long, it is argued that they are only interested in the immediate 
results of agency policies. Decisions that resolve an issue 
temporari ly or a leng thy procedure that postpones a decision until 
after the official's expected term of off ice will be more attractive 
than if the official expects to face the future consequences of 
present actions. 
In practice, the tenure of administrative officials i s ,  on 
average,  very short (President's Advisory Council,  1971) . This could 
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explain why regulatory agencies tend to focus on short-run static 
efficiency problems relating to current prices and prof its while 
forsaking long-term planning and technological change. Once again, 
though ,  this hypothesis has never been tested by examining the records 
of regulators with varying lengths of tenure. Conceivably short tenure 
could simply transfer more authority to permanent bureaucrats, whose 
experience could g ive them significant power because it makes them 
indispensable to agency operations when top level administrators lack 
expertise (Perrow, 196lb). 
In any event, one does not need the permanent income theory to 
predict a short-run orientation of regulatory agencies. The behavior 
of a rational elected official will be heavily influenced by the 
necessity to get through the next election, producing pressures from 
the Congress and the political officials in the executive to deal with 
short-run problems. And postponing unpleasant decisions will always be 
appealing unless the likely unpleasantness of the decision grows more 
rapidly than the decisionmaker's rate of time preference. Here the 
existence or fixed tenure of office provides an additional incentive, 
regardless of future employment, to postpone a decision that will 
inevitably create further problems for the agency beyond an official 's 
term of office. In fact, the permanent income hypothesis might 
actually make officials somewhat more concerned about long-tenn 
consequences of decisions because their expected future jobs in the 
regulated sector gave them a stake in the operation of the industry 
that extends beyond the tenure of their office. 
More generally, the principal deficiency with the p,ennanent 
income theory is its absence of much predictive power. While it 
predicts a tendency towards favoritism of producer groups, it does no 
more than offer a qualitative judgment. And in conflicts among 
producer groups, it does not yield predictions of behavior. At best, 
it points to one of many ways in which represented interest groups 
influence regulatory outcomes. 
External Signals 
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The last organic theory considered here is offered as an 
eclectic one, combining many features of the preceding theories. The 
discussion that follows is intended to outline the rudiments of a 
general theory of regulation, not to be a comprehensive statement of it. 
The latter requires much additional work, especially of a more formal 
nature. The underlying hypothesis of the external signal theory is 
that agencies try to serve the public interest but, because the public 
interest is such an elusive concept, have difficulty identifying it. 
Consequently , they judge the extent to which their decisions satisfy 
the public interest by observing the responses of other institutions to 
their policies and rules. 
The external signals of agency performance are numerous. 
Agencies regularly perform in what I have somewhat pompously labeled 
theaters of external judgment -- institutional settings in which 
someone outside of the agency with some control over its policies 
and/or budget passes judgment on the agency' s  performance (Noll, 
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197la ) .  Among these sources of performance indicators are the courts , 
the legislative committees that decide upon the budget and legislative 
progrmn of the agency, the relevant budget examiners in the Office of 
Management and Budget or corresponding state or local government 
agencies, the press, whose primary locus of concern is the regulated 
industry and who may criticize the agency if the performance of it 
deteriorates, and the constituent interest groups participating in 
agency procedures who, if dissatisfied with an agency decision, can 
appeal it to the courts or can take their case to the politicians or 
the press. 
From each theater of external judgment -- courts,  Congres s ,  
constituents ,  executive and press - - the agency receives a flow o f  
success indicators :  actions that express approval or disapproval with 
the agency's decisions. It  is plausible that agency's will view the 
public interest as being served if the success indicators indicate 
approval : budget requests and legislative propo sals are generally 
well-received by OMB and the overseeing congressional subcommittees; 
encounters with Congress,  whether in private or at  open congressional 
hearings, are free of serious conf lict ; agency decisions are rarely 
appealed to the courts ; when appeals are made the courts nonnally 
uphold the agency decision; and the performance of regulated firms is  
sufficiently good that journalistic inquiries into the agency's 
policies are rarely made . Behaviorally, an agency may actively seek to  
maximize the extent to which its  feedback is  positive, or  it may act 
more passively , seeking to avoid negative feedback or to receive 
positive signals to some satisfactory extent. Downs' theory sees the 
agency passing from the active to the passive mode as it grows older 
(Downs , 1968) . The satisfying model may be most relevant f•::ir 
relatively small,  unimportant agencies that normally escape notice 
(U. S. Bureau of the Budget,  1950 ) .  Bernstein's (1955) life·-cycle 
theory of regulatory agencies constitutes an argument for tirl.is view. 
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The three sources of signals that most plausibly could 
represent the public interest to an agency are the courts, elected 
political officials and the general public (including the press in all 
agencies except the FCC ) .  Since the retreat of the courts from 
substantive due process in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
the courts' primary role has been to signal procedural fairness  and a 
rational basis to agency decisions. The role of political leaders is 
more complex. To the extent a politician uses regulatory policy to 
further reelection aims he or she may seek to provide favors to 
specific constituents ,  to respond o general political swings in the 
electorate or even to  act as  a political entrepreneur or leader by 
creating a new salient issue with which he or she can be identified. 
If the latter two, the purpo se of regulation among the general 
population is important to the extent that the democratic process 
succeeds in leading to the election of political officials whose 
opinions reflect the center of public sentiment on salient issues. 
This public rationale for regulation can be one of several 
possibilitie s :  to correct market imperfections, to effect a 
redis tribution of wealth from sellers to buyers (e . g . ,  controls on 
residential rents or fuel prices) or to avoid market s  in cases in 
which consumers do not like negotiating or want to increase stability 
of prices and production (Owen and Braeutigam, 1978) . 
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Whether the general voting population is a consideration to 
politicians depends on the salience of regulatory policy -- that is,  
whether at any given time regulation, generally or a specific part of 
i t ,  is  important enough in relation to other issues that voters will 
give it significant weight in making voting decisions. This depends in 
part on whether market s  (regulated or not) are perceived to be 
performing poorly, as well as on the state of affairs in other policy 
areas such as foreign relations or public services. 
Direct citizen participation in regulatory affairs is 
relatively rare and when it does occur is usually parallel with a rise 
in the political salience of regulatory issue s .  But one form is 
probably not sensitive to politics -- the activities of the academic 
policy-research community. The presence of academic research critical 
of ineffective or inefficient regulatory policies played a key role in 
the 1 970s battles over deregulation of cable television (Besen et al . ,  
1 97 7 )  and airlines (Breyer , 1981) . 
Research can effect regulatory policy in three ways.  First, it 
can be used as a weapon by interest groups in agency, court and 
congressional processes. The advantage of this pathway is that 
decisionmakers are forced to consider it in making decisions ; however 
the disadvantage is that its scientific objectivity is highly suspect . 
Second, it can suggest to political entrepreneurs possibilities for 
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gaining recognition by successfully raising a new salient p\Jiblic issue. 
The lead role played by Senator Edward Kennedy in airl ine dE!regulation 
illustrates this pathway (Breyer, 1981) . The problem here, of course, 
is the rarity of its occurrence . Third, to the extent that public 
officials regard themselves as serving a deeper public purpose than 
creating institutionalized protection for special interest s1, they will 
be interested in scholarly work evaluating their performanc1� and will 
respond to  it if it is  regarded as  of high quality. This pathway is 
illustrated by the role o:IE research in turning around the FCC on cable 
television deregulation. This pathway is in some sense the purest 
and has the greatest aura of scientific objectivity. While it also 
appears somewhat more trodden than the second path, its maj•cir 
disadvantage is still its rarity. Obviously, a necessary Cl)ndition is  
that the research be known to the agency. This in turn requires that 
the agency include some people -- usually high level profes sional staff 
-- who keep abreast of research in pertinent areas or that the 
research connnunity plays an active role in making its results known to 
policy officials. Until the mid-1970s the former was rare among 
regulatory agenciesJ and few academics have pursued with the latter; 
hence the situation -- uncomfortable to academics -- that the first 
pathway predominates (Noll, 1 973) . 
Playing a ubiquitous role in the provision of signals to the 
agency are the interest groups who are organized to participate in 
agency information-gathering processes, to challenge agency decisions 
in the courts and to lobby politicians. The sensitivity of government 
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policy in a representative democracy to pressures from interest groups 
has l ong been recognized. James Madison in Federalist lQ_ understood 
that a key constitutional problem was how to build a democratic 
government that protected individual rights but that was not controlled 
by special intere sts. Madison's solution was to construct a 
legislature in which all important interests were likely to be 
represented but were unlikely individually to have much power. 
Regulatory agencies ,  because of their single-purpose mission and 
relatively small size, do not have this Madisonian protection when 
undertaking their quasi-legislative functions, hence their 
susceptibility to becoming dominated by special interests.  
Until the 1 960s, whereas the role of interest groups was 
recognized, relatively little attention had been given to the process 
by which interest groups are formed and become effective politically. 
The theory of interest-group mobilization is  an important part of the 
theory of agency behavior because it enables us to predict the kind of 
signals an agency will receive both through its own processes and from 
legal and political sources. Economists have formalized this theory, 
al though it is still largely qualitative in terms of its predictions 
(Olson, 1965; Davis and North, 1970; Buchanan, 1 965) . According to 
this point of view, an interest will be represented in a political 
process if it expects to gain more from representation than the costs 
of participating and if it can avoid the problem of free-riding among its 
members. 
53 
Being represented in a regulatory proceeding can be very 
expensive. When an important issue is at stake, agencies can take 
years to reach a decision, and all the while a represented group must 
retain the services of high-cost professionals -- lawyers,  engineers, 
economists. Then, after an agency announces its decision, court 
appeals and political lobbying may still be necessary. An individual 
or a group whose members share an economic interest must be willing to 
pay these costs plus any costs of organizing and maintaining the 
solidarity of the group in order to be represented effectively. 
In general, the larger and more diverse is the group, the 
greater are the expenses of becoming organized, deciding upon policies 
and strategies� and obtaining effective representation. And, in 
general, a firm or individual is  more likely to  associate with a group 
to secure representation the higher is its stake in the outcome and the 
more important to achieving its objectives is its own participation in 
group activities. An individual is not very likely to join very large 
organizations that seek ends that are not seen as very important or that 
is likely to achieve its goal even if the individual does not pay a 
fair share of the costs. As a result, a group will commit more 
resources to being represented in the regulatory process the higher is 
the per capita stake of the members in the issue. If the sum of the 
economic stakes in an issue for all members is the same for two group s ,  
the smaller group, with lower group organization costs and a higher per 
capita stake, will be more effectively represented .  
The economic model of interest-group representation leads to  
the prediction that the information and success indicators f lowing to  
the government will be  biased in favor of  smal l  groups with large per 
capita stakes in political issues and against large, diverse groups 
whose members individual ly have little stake in the out come but, 
because of their greater members , may have a larger total stake. 
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Agency capture is predicted as a special case that occurs when (a) only 
one interest group has sufficient per capita interest in the issue to 
be effectively represented and (b)  only interest-group pressure -- not, 
for example, the press or Naderesque intervenors -- can activate 
politicians, other bureaus or the courts to affect agency decisions. 
Historically ,  most regulated monopolies have fallen into this category, 
and predictably, little effect of regulation on these firms can be 
found (MacAvoy, 1970 and 1 97 1 ;  Moore 1 970) . Another illustration of 
the importance of condition (b) is argued in an interesting comparative 
study of four government agencies that support basic research (Weiner, 
1972) . Apparently independent bureaus facing only budgetary 
examination -- NSF, NIH -- are far more l ikely to exhibit capture than 
agencies that are part of larger, mission-oriented bureaus -- ONR, OSR 
-- even though in all four cases the research community is the only 
external group in significant contact with the agency. 
The external signal theory provides an explanation of the 
conditions under which Congress and the executive will engage in 
effective oversight of agencies. As discussed above, some attribute 
poor regulatory performance to a persistent tendency of political 
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leaders to ignore regulatory policy. The problem with this view is  
that on occasion Congress or the executive decides to  play a major 
role. Sometimes Congress does so by writing regulations itE1elf ( the 
Coal Mine Safety Act of 1 967 , the fleet fuel efficiency standards for 
automobiles, the Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act , 
the new source performance standards for coal-fired electric generation 
facilities) . Other times it does so through signalling its aims in the 
oversight proce s s .  The executive branch sometimes deals with agencies 
only by appointing people to them who deserve political awards . But 
sometimes it selects appointees very carefully for a wel l-d1�veloped 
policy purpose, and sometimes it institutionalizes its own oversigh t ,  
such a s  b y  creating a regulatory review bureau in the Executive Off ice 
of the President. The deeper question is why the executive and 
Congress sometimes becomes extraordinarily active. External signals 
provide an answer. When the clients of an agency are happy and the 
agency is not receiving public attention, there is no reaso11 for 
extensive political oversight.  But when agencies are in com.flict, 
appeals are made to the political system and/or regulatory :i:•olicy 
becomes salient. And age1racies that are always a focus of political 
conflict ought systemmatically to receive more political attention 
than their more placid siblings. This is born out by the turbulent 
politics of natural gas regulation ( Sanders, 1 981) and broadcasting . 
Even better evidence is the transition of teleconnnunications regulation 
from relative political obscurity to rather extensive political 
oversight in the 1970 s .  Decisions by the FCC to allow new firms into 
telecommunications as satellite operators or specialized common 
carriers created an organized interest in opposition to AT&T in the 
late 1 960s .  By the early 1970s, the executive branch had created the 
Office of Telecommunications Policy ( l ater the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration) and Congress had 
reinvigorated the subcommittees overseeing the FCC. 
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The external signal theory provides a similar explanation for 
the tendency of some agencies to develop cumbersome procedures and to  
exhibit excessive concern for the preservation of  the most important 
private equities, which are the motivational assumptions of the lawyer­
dominance, goal-deflection model. These tendencies are an agency's 
natural response to the attempts of competing organized groups to 
influence agency decisions. 
The protection of private equities is in part caused by 
Constitutional protection of rights and property, but it also arises 
from the nature of the representation proce s s .  A group which has 
become organized to represent itself in the deliberations of the 
regulatory agency is also a threat to appeal the agency ' s  decision to 
the courts,  to  lobby congres smen about the error of the agency's ways 
and to wage a public relations campaign in support of policies contrary 
to those established by the agency. An agency attempting to avoid 
negative feedback from the providers of success indicatrs will seek to 
protect the equities of the organized groups in order to avoid the 
negative feedback the groups can trigger. 
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An agency will also develop complicated decisionmak:i.ng 
procedures for reasons related to representation. First, they will 
enable the agency to gauge the stake of the represented groups in the 
issue at hand and thereby better to estimate the probabil ity each one 
will appeal any particular decision. Second, they will mak12 
participation in the process more expensive,  which will reduce the 
number of groups entering the process.  This in turn reduces the amount 
of information the agency must process and the number of threats to  
appeal agency decisions. Third, they will g ive outsiders the 
impression that the agency has behaved fairly in ga thering information 
and listening to divergent points of view. Because courts review agency 
decisions almost exclusively on the basis of procedural issue s ,  the 
chance the agency will win an appeal to the courts is greatly enhanced 
by the adoption of complex procedures (Wo l l ,  1963) . Fourth, an agency 
truly interested in serving the public interest and aware of the 
subconscious subjectivity in evaluating information from wealthy, 
prestigious sources will want to formalize procedures as a mechanism 
for depersonalizing information. The import and even perceived 
validity of information may depend upon its source. In part this is 
due to the possibility that only information from well-represented 
groups is likely to be used in legal, political or public r·elations 
attacks on the agency . But in part the reason may be entirely 
subconscious . Psychologists have found that judgments aboULt purely 
physical characteristics of objects such as weight and sizE�, as well as 
recall of events ,  depend upon the value of the object used in the 
experiment and the demeanor and status of those offering opinions 
(Asch, 1 955; Bruner and Goodman , 1947 ; Sherif, 1935) . 
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Unfortunately, formal procedures can not b e  wholly successful 
in dealing with the problem of obtaining objective, complete 
information. The sources of relevant information are normally the 
private organizations participating in the process. To the extent that 
information affects outcomes ,  firms have an incentive to use 
information strategically (Owen and Braeutigam, 1978) . While selectivity 
in introducing information into regulatory proceedings is one possibly 
productive strategy, especially in uncontested processes, other, more 
subtle strategies are also availabl e .  One is information overload. 
When a firm prof its from delay in decisions, it can benefit itself by 
introducing so much information into the proceeding that the agency can 
not digest it all in a timely fashion. Another strategy is to organize 
the regulated firm in such a way that certain types of information that 
might be damaging are never col lected or are evaluated and dealt with 
at a low, probably undetectable level in the organization. Normally a 
private business would f ind information about customer complaints of 
value ; however, in the context of economic or safety regulation, such 
data could damage the enterprise more than help it.  A f irm, in making 
certain that damaging information is kept unavailable, reduces the 
chance that its opponents will succeed in challenging an agency policy 
that the firm finds beneficial. 
The extent of observed lawyer-dominance in a regulatory 
agency is, according to the external signal theory, a consequence of 
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the extent to which the clients of the agency are well-organized, have 
mutually conflicting interests and are likely to turn to the courts 
rather than to politicians or the press for relief of decisions that 
threaten their interest . For example, Elling's ( 1 963) case study of 
hospital planning describes a decisionmaking process that sought to 
balance conflicting, well-organized interests and was extremely slow in 
reaching decisions, but, because the principal theaters in which 
pressures wt�re exerted were political and economic, did not exhibit 
lawyer-dominance. Simila.rly, the agricultural sector is diffuse and 
rather weakly organized, and its chief mechanisms for generating 
feedback to the agency are through the press and the Congreiss, rather 
than by appeals to the courts. Only in rare instances are 
representatives of other organized interests participants in making 
agricultural policies, and when they are so represented thE! process 
appears to exhibit more lawyer-dominance the Packers and Stockyard 
Administration and the Commodity Exchange Authority operatE! in much the 
same fashion as the independent regulatory commissions that have 
similar responsibilities, in comparison to the far less open and structured 
process by which agricultural prices, acreage allotments and marketing 
quotas are decided ( Bonnen in Nol l ,  1 97lb ) .  Finally, the decision-
making structure in Sweden concerning health and safety regulation 
less formal less adversarial and probably more effective ---
corresponds to a situation in which court appeals are essentially 
foreclosed (Kelman, 1981 ) . 
In the case of the Atomic Energy Con:nnission, the loosely 
organized scientific community would be expected to dominate its 
decision.making process only until the agency succeeded in creating a 
commercial nuclear energy industry. The prospect of widespread 
commercial use of atomic power creates large private equities which 
conflict with the interests of scientists and of other groups, as 
witnessed by the debate about the safety aµd environmental 
implications of nuclear electric power generators .  This generates a 
demand for the special skills of lawyers at building and operating 
systems for the resolution of conflict in a fair, equitable manne r .  
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And as the importance of the lawyers increases, the scientists are 
transformed from the dominant force in setting agency objectives to one 
of the weaker interest groups represented in an adversary process that 
reflects the values of lawyers. The consequence is a slower, more 
costly process, but one that is more likely to address a range of 
political issues that is broader than the purely technical (Cohen, 1980) . 
The preceding suggests an inherent dilemma in the regulatory 
process.  For policies favored by producers, agency procedures wil l be 
most conducive to their timely adoption if only the producers are 
represented in the process and if their principal threat to the agency 
is through political and public relations appeals, rather than appeals 
to courts . But this type of regulatory environment will not be 
favorable for otherwise desirable policies that the principal producer 
group perceives as opposed to its interests, such as when the policy 
would allow more competition or, as is often the case, when the only 
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effect of  a policy change! is an improvement in product or worker 
safety, a reduction in the environmental damage associated with 
producing a product or even a reduction in costs under certain methods 
of price and prof it regulation, such as was offered by the unit train 
(MacAvoy and Sloss, 1967) . These types of changes may receive more 
favorable attention if those who would benefit by them were: given 
representation in the proceedings,  such as by the creating a Consumer 
Advocacy Agency or nongovernmental public-interest lobbying 
organizations (Terris ,  1971) . But when the regulatory agency becomes 
the adjudicator of conflicts among divergent , represented groups who, 
among other things ,  threaten court appeals of agency decisions, l awyer­
dominance, with its slow procedures and relatively low concern for 
economic efficiency, results in retarded rates of adoption of all 
changes,  not just the ones opposed by the regulated industry. In 
similar fashion, more diverse representation makes agencies. more 
l ikely to exercis.e effective control over producers and thereby to make 
some inroads on ameliorating market imperfections, but by the same 
token it will increase the delay and the costs of adopting economically 
warranted changes in technology or market structure that are. supported 
by producers. 
This dilemma provides an argument against proposals to combine 
agencies with overlapping responsibilities in related industries. The 
purpose behind these proposals is to promote rational plan111ing: only 
by having control of all policy areas affecting a particula.r sector can 
an agency be expected to a'dopt efficient policies. For example, the 
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creation of the Department of Energy, a superagency including nearly 
all existing regulatory and other agencies with responsibilities in 
managing the energy sector, was defended because it would produce 
policy that was more sensitive to the interactions among separate 
energy industries ,  that contributed to a better balanced development of 
alternative sources of energy and that was more able to weigh the 
benefits and costs of alternative policies towards the safety and 
enviromnental effects of new institutions and technologies. Similarly , 
the Ash Council proposed that the regulatory agencies responsible for 
various components of the transportation sector -- the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal 
Maritime Commission -- be combined so that cross-modal effects of 
policies would be given more weight . 
The counterargument to these proposals is that agencies who 
must adjudicate disputes among conflicting, well-represented interests 
assign a low priority to the very purpose of establishing a 
comprehensive agency � the economically efficient operation of the 
sector over which it has authority. In principle, DOE could have 
become a comprehensive energy planning agency. In practice, it 
structured itself into quasi-independent, technology-based bureaus each 
serving a particular constituency in the energy sector. In principl e ,  
the ICC certainly i s  better able t o  implement a rational multimodal 
surface transportation policy than would be a collection of agencie s ,  
one for each surface transportation industry. I n  practice , rational 
intermodal planning never occurred because the ICC exhibited little 
concern for economic efficiency, basing decisions about prices and 
route structure almost totally on preserving the relative private 
equities in the national surface transportation system (Friedlaender, 
1 969). And1, because the ICC was not particularly interested in 
efficiency, it should be no surprise that, as time has passed, the 
regulated f irms lost some of their zeal for efficient operation. 
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The possible escapes from the Hobson' s choice of which type of 
progress to retard a l l  involve fundamental changes in the regulatory 
environment.. One approach is to merge the opposing interests in order 
to reduce the number of conf licts an agency must settle. The rationale 
for the single entity proposal in international couanunications was that 
only through merging the international carriers would the i'ederal 
Couanunications Commission and the industry make a rational choice among 
technologies -- cables versus satellites (Peck, 1 970 ) .  Of course , such 
mergers improve the ability of producers to represent themnelves 
effectively, but it also reduces the control of the agency over the 
regulated marke t .  MoreoverJ if some groups remain unrepreaentedJ the 
result is a coalition against them. For example,  Ackerman and Hassler 
( 1981) argue that a coalition of western environmental groups and the 
eastern coal industry led to the adoption of stack-gas scrubbers as  
mandatory for new coal-fired electric generation facilitie:s. Both 
groups wanted to avoid the development of a western coal i1Cldustry and 
the regulation eliminated the incentive to use low sulphur western 
coa l .  The nascent western coal industry and eastern enviri0mnentalists 
were poorly organized and not well represented, and hence lost out. 
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Another approach is to replace institutionalized protection of 
private equities with direct compensation. The disappearance of the 
CAB's subsidies of domestic airlines did not result in the bankruptcy 
of inefficient carriers or the abandonment of subsidized routes;  rather 
the direct subsidies were replaced by the use of price regulation to 
protect high-cost f irms and to create cross-subsidization -- the 
transfer of excess profits on some routes to off set losses elsewhere 
within the same firm -- orJ in Posner's (1971) term, taxation by 
regulation. Because institutionalized protection causes loss of 
production efficiency1 direct compensation should be a cheaper way to 
obtain subsidized service s .  Direct compensation would, in several 
instances, have led to more rapid adoption of new technologies which 
were retarded or prevented because of their likely effect on the 
existing distribution of equities : piggyback truck-rail shipping 
(Gellman, 1 97 1) and cable television (Noll, Peck and McGowan, 1973) are 
cases in point. Of course , direct compensation is not without costs. 
It requires a complicated procedure for determining equity losses and 
blunts incentives for efficiency and innovativenes s :  if competition 
proves too tough, compensation awaits. Whether these costs outweigh 
the costs of institutionalized preservation of equity remains to be 
determined; certainly a definitive study of the effects of the 
abandonment ot truck airline subsidies in the 1950s would contribute to 
that end. 
A third approach is to break away from the model of regulation 
by expert judgment. One possibility is to free regulators from formal 
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rules of procedure but to make their decisions only advisory to the 
legis lature, putting policy responsibility on the shoulders of 
politically accountable officials. Another possibility is dlirect 
election of ·regulatory authorities or referenda on regulatory policies, · 
either of which would add a direct signal from the electorate to the 
others received by the agency. In some states, public utility 
connnissions are directly elected, but no work has ever been done on 
whether this affects agency behavior. An important paper on local 
urban renewal authorities does illustrate that a requirement to pass a 
referendum on a urban renewal plan substantially reduces thE� extent to 
which an urban renewal plan substantially reduces the extent to which 
an urban renewal authority designs projects to suit special interests ,  
particularly developers (Plott, 1 968) . 
These more political approaches raise new problems. Most 
obviously, because it is not clear that agency policies stray from. the 
intent of Congress, the effect of making these policies more directly 
related to politics could be minimal. An election-referendum system, 
given the extent of regulation, would lead to a horrendously 
complicated ballot. Statj�S in which referenda and initiatives are 
relatively easy to place on the ballot have proverbial bedsheet 
ballots which require considerable voter sophistication if the results 
are to be valid indicator1s of preferences ,  particularly given the 
inct::ntives for rational ignorance in a multi-issue, multi-choice, 
large-electorate election (Downs,  1957 ) .  An alternative to direct 
elections is a collegial hotly of representatives of differe1at 
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constituencies, such as is sometimes used in establishing water basin 
planning authorities and, in Illinois, the state air pollution control 
agency. These attempts to conserve on the limited attention span of 
voters in direct elections by creating decisionmaking subsets of the 
electorate that are somehow representative of the divergence of views 
on the issue. Of course, in this type of body, the voting rules and 
the distribution of voting strengths among constituencies have very 
important -- and very complicated � affects on outcomes (Haefele, 
1973 ; Dorfman and Jacoby, 1970; Levine and Plott, 1975). 
Concluding Observations on Organic Theories 
One principal conclusion to be derived from the discussion of 
organic theories of regulatory agencies is that simple analogies to the 
theory of the firm and markets do not appear to be very powerful in 
explaining processes in which the out come is determined by interest­
group aggregation. This is due in part to important differ-ences 
between decentralized and col lective decision prOcesses and in part to 
the nature of administrative jobs. The American federal service is a 
remarkably effective device for turning agencies away from objectives 
based solely on financial measures such as personal income and agency 
budget (Tullock, 1 965; Warner et a l . ,  1 963) . This f eature strengthens 
the case for a perceived public interest model of decisionmaking like 
the external signal theory . Harsanyi ( 1 964) has speculated that one 
axiom of individual preference theory should be low-cost objectivity 
that an individual has to have a significant stake in an issue before 
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behavior becomes motivated by self-interest . It so, the insulation 
of decisionmakers from much of a direct financial stake in any single 
issue breeds an attitude of detaclunent and objectivity. Combined with 
the uncertainties and informational problems faced by agencies, as 
emphasized by March and Simon ( 1 958) , a public-interest orientation 
seems to lead inevitably to an external-signal behavioral system. 
Another general conclusion is that regulation does not have an 
immutable tendency to create cartels.  Indeed, a captured agency is a 
predictable result of a specific set of political conditions, just as  
is an agency which focuses primarily on economic efficiency or an 
agency which is primarily interested in preserving historical 
relationships among different categories of suppliers. 
The final conclusion is  that a general theory of regulatory 
activity is a promising possibility. In particular, positive political 
theory, built upon the rational-actor hypothesis, provides falsifiable 
propo sitions about the sources of changes in regulatory policy. 
Moreover, these propositions appear to explain a great deal of 
regulatory history. Of course, much work remains to establish this 
conclusion firmly. The alternative view that there is no general 
political theory of regulation, defended most strongly by Wilson 
( 1980) , cannot yet be dismissed. 
STRUCTURAL THEORIES 
An enormous l iterature far more extensive than t:he 
literature on organic theories of agency behavior -- has developed on 
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how and why organizations become structured as they do, and what 
differences structure makes in an agency; s  performance. Yet almost 
none of this literature is focussed on regulation per se. The 
highlights of the former will be summarized before proceeding with the 
literature relating structure to performance and with an attempt to 
connect this theory to regulatory behavior. 
Determinants of Structures 
No rigorous , formal theory of the structural development of 
organizations has been developed. Instead, the literature on the topic 
consists of a series of partial, single-effect-single-cause 
conjectures .  Most are based implicitly at  least o n  a rational-actor 
conception of organizational structure -- that i s ,  organizations 
develop as they do because it is efficient for them to do so. Of 
course , because much of the relevant theoriz ing is by sociologists�  the 
rational choice process is rarely made explicit , a notable exception 
being Blau ( 1 970) . 
A major line of theoretical inquiry has been directed towards 
justifying Weber's unproven assertion about the optimality of 
bureaucratic structures, which he described as having the fol lowing key 
characteristics : functional specialization of jobs, formal rules to 
make decisions impersona l ,  a hierarchical authority structure for 
communication and control, and employment based upon objective measures 
of competence and qualification. 
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One body of theory ( Blau, 1970 ; Blau and Schoenhen, 1971) flows 
from the fol lowing set of assumpt ions: organizations are goal-directed 
and attempt to achieve efficient operation ; individuals hav1� limited 
capacities for receiving communication and controlling subordinates ; 
and, a la Adam Smith, increasing specialization of jobs leads to 
increasing worker productivity . As an organization grows, then, it 
will have ever-expanding opportunities for engaging in divi1�ion of 
labor but ever-increasing problems in monitoring and controlling 
individual performance. In order to sacrifice as little division of 
labor as possible while retaining control, an organization will have 
specialized subunits as numerous as is consistent with communication 
and control capabilities, and the number of hierarchical levels will 
depend on the size of the organization and the extent of division of 
labor that is practiced. Furthermore ,  to expand the ability of 
superiors to control subordinates, parallel hierarchical s tiructures 
will be split along functional lines so that the subordinate group of  
any superior i s  more homogeneous. In organizations with diverse 
activities the number of administrators required to control specialized 
associates may increase more rapidly than the total number of employees 
as the organization grows (Aiken and Hage, 1 968;  Blau, 1970; Terrien 
and Mil l s ,  1 955) . 
To increase the ability of superiors to control subc>rdinates 
and to reduce communications per organization member, as much as 
possible of the activity of the organization will be routinized through 
formal rules. Formal rules can be consulted by subordinates without 
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communication with the superior and can be a reference point for 
communicating changes.  Hence, as an organization grows, its opt imal 
s tructural arrangement becomes more hierarchical -- both the number of 
parallel hierarchies and the number of hierarchical levels increase 
and more formalized, impersonal and routinized in operations. 
The extent of hierarchical development and functional grouping 
of increasingly narrower tasks depends upon the nature of the activities 
of the organization (Blau and Scott, 1962) . Hierarchies present 
problems of communicating performance information upwards and commands 
downwards through multiple levels because at each stage some 
information and some control are lost. The extent of hierarchical 
development that is optimal will, therefore, depend upon the extent to 
which coordination, information and instruction are needed : units 
along an assembly line , for example,  require far more coordination 
and hence a better information-control system -- than departments in a 
retail store. Conversely, the greater are the gains from division of 
labor, the greater is the optimal degree of hierarchical structure.  
Another body of theory flows from the observation that 
organizations develop for the purpose of finding solutions to problems 
that no single individual could solve. It is based on the view that 
part of the process of solving a problem is developing alternatives 
from uncertain information about cause and effect and about the 
environment in which the organization operates (March and Simon, 1958) . 
Organizations will divide unsolvable problems into manageable 
component s ,  with those responsible for each subproblem attempting to 
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reduce informational uncertainties and find acceptable, but not 
necessarily optimal,  partial solutions. The solution to the problem 
that is finally developed, still being based to some extent on 
uncertain information and on a marriage of acceptable solutions to 
component problem s ,  will depend heavily on the initial factoring of the 
problem and the sequence in which information and subproblem solutions 
are generated. As time progresses , the organization learns by 
experience which methods of factoring problems and generating 
information tend to produce desirable results, and will regularize 
them (Cyert and March, 1 963) . By this process the functional 
divisions within the organization are developed. 
Another line of theory flows from assumptions about the 
reaction of an organization to its environment. If the organization is  
threatened by external group s ,  it wil l alter its  structure to ease the 
threat .  One mechanism is to set up substructures that permit the 
external client group to influence the organization (Selznic�k, 1943; 
Thompson and McEwen, 1958) . This structural response causes; 
debureaucraticization in the sense that those at the bottom of the 
structure, b1ecause they interfere with the potentially threatening 
client, transmit the client's policy wishes up the hierarchy (Aiken and 
Rage ,  1968; Corwin, 1972) .. Another possible structural response is to 
develop protective relations with other client groups that offset the 
threat of the first client group (Blau and Scott, 1963) . A third 
structural response is to develop regularized relations with external 
organizations to reduce uncertainties about the outcomes of alternative 
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courses of action (Cyert and March, 1962) . In this instance the other 
organization is not so much a threat as a presence whose behavior is 
unpredictable unless some sort of normalized relationship can be 
developed by connecting the organizational structures . All of these 
possibilities apply equally to agencies and the organizations with 
which they deal . The symbiosis grows upwards in both organizations 
from the point of contact,  making it especially difficult to undo 
through changes at  the top -- such as by appointing new administrators .  
Structure and Performance 
The development of causal conceptual models of the structure of 
organizations inevitably led to the discovery of costs as well as 
benefits in Weber's ideal bureaucratic structure. Most of these ideas 
have appeared in the literature of sociology; however they have not 
been particularly wel l  developed, owing to an unexplainable abandonment 
of the presumption of rational development once a potential cost is 
identified. This criticism will become more apparent as the various 
theoretical ideas are explored. 
Division of Labor. One of the consequences of division of 
labor into homogeneous groups with specialized tasks is the creation of 
clusters of organization members who possess expertise and technical 
skills. Their technical sophistication makes them more difficult to 
monitor and control,  for their superiors in the organization become 
unable to comprehend the requirements of the job they perform. By 
originating the upward flow of information, these groups can deflect 
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organizational objectives (Blau and Scott, 1962; Eisenstadt, 1958) . 
By similar argument, the development of structures for dealing 
with external threat creates a specialized, expert group with control 
over an important block of information. This group, too, has a 
perception of identity. Because of its close association with the 
external group, its mandate to build working relations with it and its 
unusual ability to translate policy upward through the hiera.rchy, it 
can have its own objectives and, through its control of information and 
partial policymaking authority, direct the operation of the 
organization towards serving some combination of its own welfare and 
that of its external client (Eisenstadt , 1 958) . 
The preceding model has serious problems when appliE!d to 
competitive, profit-oriented enterprises because it abstracts from the 
participation of the f irm in factor and product markets,  and hence from 
the variables that determine the amount of slack in the organization 
and the bargaining strengths of superiors and subordinates. When 
applied to regulatory agencies and regulated firms, it make1:0 more 
sense . Agencies deal with ambiguous problems involving subatantial 
technical expertise, and the firms are partially protected from 
competition, so conditions are present for inefficiency to be possible .  
The issue boils down t o  an empirical one: do superiors receive 
sufficient information from subordinates to judge the perfo:rmance of 
the subordinates and to make rational decisions? 
Kaufman and Couzens ( 1973) asked exactly this question in 
examining information flows in nine government agencies and found that 
in seven cases the information received by the agency decisionmakers 
was accurate enough, complete enough and digestible enough ( it was 
neither impossibly voluminous nor excessively technical) so that 
administrators did know what subordinates were doing and how to alter 
their behavior if they so desired. The study concluded that 
subordinate behavior that was· inconsistent with publicized agency 
policy was either desired by the administrator or of too little 
consequence to generate compensating action. 
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These findings should not be surprising, for they are 
consistent with the same theoretical model that led to the predictions 
of how structure would develop in the first place. The argument that 
structural differentiation of responsibilities proceeds along 
rational, goal-directed lines should lead to the conclusion that among 
the costs entering the decisions about structure will be whatever loss 
of control the administrator must fact under alternative structural 
regimes.  If  a structure is created that gives substantial 
discretionary authority to a particular subgroup of the organization, 
it is because that particular structure seemed to produce more 
desirable results than the alternatives. In particular, if the 
substructure organized to deal with a threatening client gains 
ascendency, it seems sensible to make the causal influence the 
threatening client, not the resulting substructure. Arnold Weber's 
( 1 973) discussion of the decision to create an independent price 
control authority indicates awareness of precisely the factors 
discussed here at the highest level of the executive. In any event , a 
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rationalistic structural theory based upon the benefits of divided 
l abor and the costs of maintaining coordination and control is not 
logically consistent with an assumption that the administrator ignores 
the costs of creating an organizational subgroup with autonomous power. 
When applied to regulation, the principal implication of this 
theory is that regulatory agencies will tend to structure thiemselves by 
creating separate hierarchies for each client group. An exrunple is the 
creation of the Cable Television Bureau at the FCC after the agency 
asserted jurisdiction over cable and began to regulate it.  A second 
implication is that these functional divisions will develop close 
associations and even a merged identity with their related client s ,  and 
will grow into powerful influences from the bottom up on agency policy. 
This provides an explanation for a capture theory of regulation that 
does not depend on the nature of appointments at the top of the agency 
or on the delivery of favors by elected politicians, except insofar as  
administrators or politicians consciously structure agencies for such 
reasons. A third implication is that in some circumstances the 
structuring process leads to reform. Specifically, when client groups 
conflict, so do their bureaus. Hence, the creation of a cable bureau 
guaranteed that cable deregulation eventually had to be faced squarely 
by the FCC. 
Formalized Rules . Another set of arguments relating structure 
and performance focuses on. the effects of formalized rules. The 
impersonal and communications-conserving features of formalized rules 
may generate benefits of the kind described above, but they may have 
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undesirable side-effects as well.  First, being based on a minimum 
acceptable performance ,  they weaken incentives for better performance 
by extramarginal workers (Gouldner, 1954) and promote conformity of 
behavior among workers and through time (Thompson, 1 965) . Second, 
rules initially designed to bring subordinates under better control 
develop over time into a statement of the rights and duties of a class 
of workers.  As such, their maintenance becomes an objective of its 
own, creating inflexibility and rigidity in the organization (Merton, 
1936) . Both are examples of what Merton calls fal se-generalization -­
a procedure that works once is permanently adopted with unanticipated 
counterproductive long-term consequences. 
The same argument could be applied to rules and procedures 
relating to the relationship between an organization and its client s .  
What i s  originally designed a s  a mechanism for acquiring information 
and exercising control may become a right that is valued by clients as 
they adjust their behavior to accommodate the system (Di l l ,  1962) . 
The generalization of the preceding argument is that there is a 
factor that retards organizational adaptability, a kind of structural 
inertia. It is somehow more expensive to change existing structures 
and patterns of relationships than to construct new one s ,  so that when 
a structure becomes outdated due to external changes it is inhibited in 
its ability to adjus t .  Otherwise, when an administrator observed 
performance standards and procedural rules leading to diminishing 
productivity, he would simply alter the structure, rules and procedure. 
In short, rules and procedures create valuable property rights for 
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those who enforce or are pirotected by them. Hence, a group is created 
to defend them that did not exist -- and therefore did not work for 
them � at their creation. 
Perhaps a fruitful theoretical path in developing a model of 
organizational inertia would follow from the concept of learning by 
doing (Arrow, 1962) . Individuals  schooled in an old structu1re may have 
to go through a period of unlearning old rules and methods b1e:fore they 
can master the new. This would occur if,  as some have found, formal 
rules lead to a reduced ability to cope with unusual events and a 
mechanical reliance on established methods (Shepard, 1967; W.arner & 
g., 1963) . Without job tenure organizational structures could freely 
change, but with job tenure it could be more costly to chang1?; to a new 
system and l ive through the unlearning process than to  start the system 
from scratch. 
Arguments predicting long-term rigidities in an agen.cy can not 
be readily dismissed by appeals to the rational choice model of 
structuring. Given the presence of a discount rate or of a planning 
horizon fixed by tenure of office, long-term consequences of present 
structural and procedural decisions are l ikely to be given little 
weight . The problem is aggravated to  the extent that the 
administrators face a situation of bounded rationality in which more 
problems clamor for attention than can ever be solved and in which the 
future is uncertain. 
The key empirical prediction of this theory is that formalized 
organizations like regulat ory agencies are resistant to change. This 
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should lead regulatory agencies to  try to solve new problems with old 
methods and could account for the shortsightedness in decisionmaking 
mentioned in the discussion of the permanent-income theory. In the 
case ot a new policy issue, old practices may be inappropriately 
applied and thereby prevent or retard a response. Furthermore, because 
many of the formalized rules and practices apply to relations between 
the agency and its client, they are likely to retard policy changes in 
client organizations as well. This offers an alternative explanation 
to the one based on preservation of private equities for bias in the 
rate and pattern of innovation and change in regulated industries. 
The structural inertia theory suggests that an apt 
characterization of the life history of a regulatory agency is that, as 
a result of a short-term planning horizon arising from rational 
individual behavior by administrators, performance is relatively 
efficient in the beginning but steadily deteriorates as the agency 
grows older. An organizational structure is thus quite similar to a 
very long-lived capital asset with high disposal costs -- like a 
central city whose large buildings were designed according to rational 
comparison of the net value of alternatives ,  based upon calculations 
many decades ago that placed virtually no weight on the disposal 
problems that eventually had to be faced. Present problems of 
replacing these capital asse ts,  nineteenth century buildings or 
outmoded organizational structures, can be viewed as an inevitable 
out come of decisions arising from individual rational choice 
processes. 
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Some ideas have been offered on how to structure organizations 
so that they are more flexible and adaptable. Generally, the most 
important result is that structures that do a relatively go()d job in 
dealing with recurring problems also do relatively poorly when faced 
with a new problem requiring creative, adaptive behavior, and vice 
versa (Burns and Stalker, 1966; Shepard, 1 967; Thompson, 1965). 
Adaptive behavior requires looser, less hierarchial, more informal 
arrangements, which reduce the extent to which behavior can be 
controlled from above (Aiken and Hage, 1968;  Hage and Aiken , 1 96 7 ;  
Weiner, 1 972) . This suggests that regulatory agency wil l be better 
prepared to deal expeditiously with changes in the regulated industry, 
such as those created by technological advances, if one of its 
functional divisions is a planning and research staff with minimal 
formal responsibilities and some real authority. 
Most agencies, especially in response to the wave o:f enthusiasm 
over cost-effectiveness analysis that swept through Washington in the 
1960s, have created planning offices along the lines the th•eory 
suggests (Schultze, 1 968). Regulatory reform at the CAB and FCC in 
the 1970s, for exampleJ  began with the creation of first-rate offices 
for policy analysis, staffed primarily by economists. Of course , while 
this creates a potential source of adaptive responses to changing 
external conditions, it does not guarantee responsiveness  by the 
agency, as those who have f Llled planning functions can attest (Joint 
Economic Committee, 1 969) � The creation of a planning institution does 
not give administrative leaders more motivation to consider the long-
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term consequences of their actions. In order for agencies to develop 
more flexible policies, they must possess the incentive as well as the 
ability to do so (Mohr, 1 96 9 ;  Weiner, 1 972) . 
Several propo sals to provide an incentive for long-term 
planning have been made. Agencies could be required to submit regular 
multi-year plans for future policy to the legislature (Cary, 1 967) . 
Congress could include an expiration date in the legislation 
establishing administrative agencies that would lead to periodic review 
of the agency's purpo se and performance (Friendly, 1 962) . The tenure 
of administrative policymaking positions might be lengthened, perhaps 
to lifetime appointments as with Supreme Court justices, not only to 
increase independence through job security but to lengthen the planning 
horizon of the decisionmaker (Bernstein, 1955) . Whether these changes 
can overcome the short-term focus of the political system remains 
unproven. Sunilarly, also remaining unproven is how much the active 
resistance to change by regulatory agencies is accounted for by these 
structural explanations and how much by the sensitivity to private 
equities in the status quo hypothesized in the external signal theory. 
The more important is the latter, the less is the likelihood that 
structural changes wil l matter. 
Fuzzy Output.  Another structural explanation of deteriorating 
performance arises from the difficulty of defining and measuring the 
output of most government agencies . A hypothesized first law of public 
administration is that measuring the output of public activities is 
systematically more difficult than measuring output in private 
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production, leading to an especially great difficulty in attaining 
technical efficiency in a public agency (Olson, 1 973) . Nevertheless, 
for external and internal reasons, agencies must develop pE!rformance 
measures and standards. The more ambiguous is the product of the 
agency, the further removed is the performance measure from a true 
index of the product the agency is designed to produce and the greater 
is the likelihood that the agency will, over time, assign increasingly 
greater weight to the measurable component of output (Cohen, 1 965;  
Perrow, 196lb) . 
This tendency is certainly observable in some regulatory 
agencies .  One example i s  the enormous attention paid by the Federal 
Trade Commission during the 1 960s to its rather mundane 
responsibilities in textile and fur labeling (Noll, 197 lb) .. Another 
example is the procedures adopted by the Federal Power Com1nission to 
measure its activity -- namely, specific price decisions -·� and the 
result it created in terms of thousands of meaningless cas1!s (MacAvoy, 
1 97 1 ) .  Still another i s  the attempt of the FCC to  e stabli13h criteria 
for assessing the extent to which an applicant for a broadcast license 
was likely to serve the public interest (Spitzer, 1979) . Attention to  
these measurable components may also influence technical decisions in 
regulated firms as both regulator and producer became oriented towards 
suboptimizations of an incomplete characterization of industry 
performance. 
As with the other partial theoretical observations, this 
argument has not been established to have a great quantitative 
significance in terms of regulatory behavior. It stands as another 
addition to the file of potential costs to be considered when 
establishing a regulatory agency. 
Observations on Structural Theories 
82 
The overriding characteristic of all of these structural 
arguments is that empirical tests are woefully lacking particularly 
with respect to regulatory agencies . In order for structural theories 
to be treated seriously in the public policy process,  the l iterature 
must be extended beyond the current status of essentially wise musings 
about partial, ceteris paribus effects. Cases of structural change in 
agencies should be studied with an eye towards estimating the 
significance of the structural effects on agency policies and producer 
performance ,  not only in the short run, which tends to pick up 
primarily Hawthorne effects (Blau and Scott , 1962; Roethlisberger and 
Dickson, 1939) , but also in the long run. 
COMMON THEMES 
Several consistent themes run through the numerous conceptual 
models of administrative behavior. To a significant degree the 
theoretical models are alternative explanations for essentially the 
same phenomena which, in all disciplines, scholars have generally come 
to agree are characteristic of regulatory policies. 
First, to the extent that a consistent majority opinion in the 
electorate exists and can be characterized as representing a def inition 
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of the public interest, the delegation of decisionmaking to regulatory 
agencies leads to policies that drift from this position. This 
suggests a loss of public control through successive delegations -- to 
Congress to subcommittee to agency to lower hierarchical lj�vels  in the 
agency. Furthermore ,  for a g iven agency and policy the drift grows 
larger through time until performance is bad enough to recreate 
political salience to the regulatory policy. 
Second, capture by clients is common. The direction of drift 
from the hypothetical majority opinion is in the direction of the 
welfare of the particular groups in greatest contact with the 
regulatory agency and is most pronounced in agencies with very narrow 
responsibilities that have contact with few interest group13 . 
Third, regulatory agencies are inflexible and rigid, too slow 
to adapt policies to changing external conditions. Decisi•:>ns tend to 
be based excessively upon short-run considerations and upo:n the 
preservation of the existing socioeconomic structure,  which leads 
agencies to retard technological advancement and to resist new sources 
of competition unless they can be shown to leave the existing 
institutional system and distribution of wealth largely unchange� . 
l''ourth, regulation causes changes in client organizations that 
detract from their efficiency and perhaps even their viability in an 
unregulated environment. It affects the selection of leaders by 
private organizations, placing premiums on personnel who can deal 
effectively with government officials and legal processes rather than 
on those who do best at the primary function of the organization. It 
deflects resources and attention to a fundamentally unproductive 
activity, participation in formalized processes. And it sacrifices 
some warranted innovations and other economic changes by raising the 
costs of creativity and the wages of inefficiency through protecting 
the established ways of doing busine s s .  
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Fifth, cures may lie in two general directions : reducing the 
advantage of small, wel l-organized groups in political and regulatory 
decisionmaking and making more flexible the various organizational 
structures through which authority is delegated. Among proposals that 
might accomplish these objectives are: ( ! )  public interest lobbyists
that would g ive representation to less wel l-organized groups having a 
large, aggregate stake in a regulatory issue; (2)  greater insulation of 
the political process from organized interests, such as by changing the 
method of financing political campaigns and requiring complete 
financial disclosures by candidates ;  (3) changes in the congressional 
committee structure, such as by finding an alternative to the divisions 
of responsibility among subcommittees according to agencies and 
functions; (4) greater politicization of regulatory decisions by making 
offices elected, by allocating positions to constituencies or by making 
decisions advisory to political bodies;  (5)  simplifications in agency 
procedures that would make participation in the process by outsiders 
less expensive and that would free agencies from formal rules of 
evidence; ( 6 )  alterations in the structure and nature of the 
participants in the regulated market such as by nationalization, 
dissolution of large firms , mergers of small  firms or legal 
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redefinition of property right s ;  or ( 7 )  formalization of a long-term 
planning process by creating a permanent, well-staffed, nonhierarchical 
planning group wi�hin each agency, by requiring regular submission of 
long-term policy plans and by including expiration dates in 
regulatory laws.  
A conventional economic argument against incentive systems for 
promoting any particular kind of behavior is that they are 
insufficiently selective -- that is,  that the extra-marginal decisions 
which wi.11 not be affected by the incentives are nevertheless 
subsidized or taxed. The folk wisdom on regulatory agencies suggests 
that the regulatory solution has its own problems, which may tip the 
efficiency balance the other way. Specifically, regulatory agencies 
can come to represent the interests of their clients. The key to wise 
choice among instruments of public policy 
incentives versus reorga11.ization of firms 
regulation veirsus 
is to be able to 
characterize accurately the conditions that are more or leBs conducive 
to effective regulation. 
Unfortunately, more definite specification of the 1:::ausal 
relationships between policy actions and performance is no1t justified 
on the basis of the current state of knowledge about regul.atory 
decisionmaking. The theory of regulatory behavior is rudimentary and 
fragmentary, although it is promising and progressing. EmJPirical work 
is almost nonexistent on the kinds of issues of interest to policy 
makers. 
Certainly the most productive areas for further scholarly 
research at this stage are for detailed studies of how regulatory 
agencies actually work and what factors influence their performance.  
In order to understand how, if at all,  regulatory processes can be 
improved, scholars must start investigating the empirical importance 
of political and organizational influences or decisions. 
Many more case studies of agencies and policies must be 
undertaken to provide an empirical basis to begin sorting out which 
theoretical models seem to work best. Examples of the kind of work 
that needs to be done are Weingast ( 1 982) on congressional control of 
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the FTC and Cohen ( 1980) on the process of nuclear safety regulation. It 
is no longer enough for a researcher to identify some egregious example 
of  regulatory malfeasance ; that agencies create significant
inefficiencies is well established. What is now required is  some 
insight into how this performance can be improved, and this requires 
more study of the relationships among private sector performance, the 
decisionmaking process within the agency and the nature of the 
political proces s .  
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